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A JOINT TASK FORCE DESIGN TO CONDUCT  
SUSTAINED COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS  
ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by


JOSEPH A. SOUTHCOTT, MAJ, USA  
B.A., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1984  
M.S.O.R., Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, 1992

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
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Name of Candidate: MAJ Joseph A. Southcott

Thesis Title: A Joint Task Force Design to Conduct Sustained Counterdrug Operations Along the Southwest Border

Approved by:

  
John A. Reichley, M.S., Thesis Committee Chairman

  
LTC Noel B. Bergeron, M.A., Member

  
Arthur T. Frame, Ph.D., Member

Accepted this 7th day of June 1996 by:

  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

A JOINT TASK FORCE DESIGN TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS  
ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER by MAJ Joseph A. Southcott, USA 119  
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This study designs a joint task force of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces to conduct sustained counterdrug operations in support of law enforcement agencies along the southwest border (SWB) of the United States. The study reviews the impact of drugs on society, the specific SWB drug threat, the geographical area defined as the SWB, the national strategy for fighting drugs, the historical involvement of military forces, and the legality of military operations in support of the war on drugs.

The analysis used in this study reviewed support requests completed by military forces in support of law enforcement agencies during fiscal year 1995. Support requests were sorted into related battlefield operating systems (BOS). They were further sorted by service component responsible for completing the support request. For each service component within each BOS the average number of personnel deployed per day was calculated and then used to select a force structure to complete support requests for an operational tempo of thirty days. The study concludes that a brigade size joint task force could conduct sustained counterdrug operations to support drug law enforcement agencies efforts to interdict the flow of illicit drugs along the SWB.

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I would also like to thank my family; my wife Lisa and my children, Benjamin and Kimberly. Without their love, support, and encouragement this project could not have been accomplished.

I dedicate this thesis to all persons involved in the "war" on drugs and to all my fellow members of the profession of arms; past, present, and future.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AA	Active Army
AAF	Active Army Forces Command
AAS	Active Army Special Operations
AAT	Active Army Training and Doctrine Command
AR	Army Reserve
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARS	Army Reserve Special Operations
ASD(SOLIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
BOS	Battlefield operating systems
CES	Civil Engineer Squadron
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
COMPUSEC	Computer Security
CONUS	Continental United States
D	Department of Defense
D.C.	District of Columbia
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DEP&S	Drug Enforcement Policy and Support
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLEA	Drug Law Enforcement Agency
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency

FA	Active Air Force
FG	Air Force Air National Guard
FR	Air Force Reserve
FRS	Air Force Reserve Special Operations
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FY95	Fiscal Year 1995
GSR	Ground Surveillance Radar
GSS	Ground Surveillance System
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
JTF	Joint Task Force
LAAM	Light Antiaircraft Missile
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LEB	Law Enforcement Brigade
LERF	Law Enforcement Reaction Force
LP/OP	Listening Post/Observation Post
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
MA	Active Marine Corps
MAJ	Major
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MR	Marine Corps Reserve
NA	Active Navy
NAS	Active Navy Special Operations
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NR	Navy Reserve
NSA	National Security Agency

NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
RLSO	Regional Logistics Support Office
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSU	Rapid Support Unit
SCAMP	Sensor Control and Management Platoon
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SRIG	Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group
SWB	Southwest Border
SWRTS-I	Southwest Region Training Site-Imagery
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
U.S.	United States
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

As a means of introducing the research, this chapter reviews background information concerning counterdrug operations. The purpose and the thesis of the research is presented. The impact of drugs on the American society is included to illustrate the devastating effects of illegal drugs. A short description of the Southwest Border (SWB) is included to orient the geographical area covered in the research. The National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the National Drug Control Strategy's position on the use of military forces in counterdrug operations is reviewed. Also included is a review of the various organizations in this country which have a part in counterdrug operations to illustrate the nation's commitment to solving the drug problem. A chronology of events is outlined to illustrate the evolution of the military's involvement in counterdrug operations. A brief presentation on the Posse Comitatus Act and Title 10, United States (U.S.) Code is included to address the legality of the use of the military in counterdrug operations. The chapter ends with a presentation of those topics that the research did not address.

#### Purpose and Thesis Statement

The U.S. continues to wage a "war" on drugs. It may very well turn out to be the longest war ever waged by this country. With each passing year national resources, in the form of money and manpower, are committed to fighting the war. However, though it has been termed a

war, it is at best a limited war and therefore continues to be protracted. It is a limited war because the government chooses to only commit bits and pieces of its national power assets, such as diplomacy, information, military, and economic. The failure of the government to commit serious resources from each of the elements of power results in a protracted war.

One of the operational and tactical aspects of the war is interdiction. Interdiction at the operational level is conducted by numerous government agencies. Within the Department of Defense (DoD) the operational level of interdiction missions in the continental U.S. is the mission of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), headquarters at Fort Bliss, Texas. Figure 1 on page three illustrates JTF-6's area of operations. The purpose of this research was to determine the organization of a joint task force, consisting of active and or reserve forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps whose mission it would be to conduct sustained tactical counterdrug operations to support drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA) interdiction efforts along the SWB.

#### The Cost of the Drug Problem

The price tag attached to this country's drug problem is not cheap. The cost of the drug problem takes two forms. The first is the cost to fight the drug war to stop the use of drugs in this country. The federal drug control budget has steadily increased over the years. As a comparison, the budget in 1988 was \$4,707,800 and in 1994 it was \$12,136,200. For 1995 the president requested \$13,179,800.

The second form is the cost to treat those persons who are casualties of the drug war. Casualties of the drug war include but are not restricted to persons who have become addicted, persons who have become incarcerated, persons who have been injured for any reason

# AREA OF JTF-6 OPERATIONS




Figure 1. Joint Task Force Six Area of Operations. Source: U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, 1996 Command Briefing, Slide "Area of JTF-6 Operations" (Fort Bliss, TX: Joint Task Force Six, 1996).

related to drug use, and persons who because of another person's drug habit have been denied the finances to thrive. Over the past six years the number of persons treated for drug abuse has been approximately three times the treatment capacity. Over the past five years the number of persons in federal and state prisons has grown. Furthermore, the percentage of the inmate population who are drug offenders has increased from 44.8 percent in 1988 to 59.6 percent in 1992. The number of drug-related emergency room visits has also increased over the last five years. In 1988 the total number of drug-related cases was 403,578 compared to 433,493 in 1992. In 1992, there were 1,291 murders related to drugs. On the average a person was murdered, because of drugs, in the U.S. every seven hours. A closing example of the cost of this problem is the amount of money spent by people who use illegal drugs. The total amount of money spent on illegal drugs in 1991 was \$48.6 billion. It is probably a safe bet that this money was most likely meant to be used to put food on a table, a roof over a head, or clothes on a back.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Threat

The threat is any illegal drug and the numerous organizations that traffic illegal drugs in this country. Illegal drugs are also known as controlled substances by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The DEA lists five major categories of controlled substances: narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and cannabis (marijuana and hashish). There are numerous specific illegal drugs within each of the categories. Table 1 lists the specific drugs assigned to each category. The top three illegal drugs used in the U.S. are cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Of the three, cocaine is the most threatening because of its national availability. Heroin is a close

second because it is highly addictive and there is an ongoing increase in its production. Marijuana is a problem because it is produced within the U.S. and is also an imported drug.

TABLE 1  
CATEGORIES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

Categories	Drugs
Narcotics	Opium, Morphine, Codeine, Heroin, Hydromorphone, Meperidine, Methadone, Other Narcotics
Depressants	Chloral Hydrate, Barbiturates, Benzodiazephines, Methaqualone, Glutethimide, Other Depressants
Stimulants	Cocaine, Amphetamines, Phenmetrazine, Other Stimulants
Hallucinogens	LSD, Mescaline & Peyote, Amphetamine Variants, Phencyclidine Phencyclidine Analogues, Other Hallucinogens
Cannabis	Marijuana, Tetrahydrocannabinol, Hashish, Hashish Oil

Source: Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), II-2.

The enemy will most likely enter the U.S. through one of six high-intensity drug-trafficking areas (HIDTA). A HIDTA is an area that has "the most serious drug trafficking problems and the most pressing need for more Federal assistance."<sup>5</sup> The six HIDTAs are New York City; Baltimore; Washington D.C.; Miami; Houston; Los Angeles; and the SWB. Figure 2 shows the six HIDTAs on a U.S. map. This figure also illustrates the specific types of drugs that enter the country through HIDTAs. Furthermore, the figure depicts the possible onward movement of drugs through the interior of the country.

# MOVEMENT OF DRUGS




Figure 2. High-Intensity Drug-Trafficking Areas and Inland Movement of Drugs. Source: U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, 1996 Command Briefing, Slide "Movement of Drugs" (Fort Bliss, TX: Joint Task Force Six, 1996).

### The Southwest Border

The SWB is the international border between the U.S. and Mexico. The border is a vast unprotected area extending approximately 1,700 miles.<sup>4</sup> It extends from San Diego, California to Brownsville, Texas. It includes four states, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. It also includes the Rio Grande River. The SWB is shown in figure 3. There are somewhere between 150 to 200 organizations involved in smuggling based in Mexico. The primary threat is smuggling over land, both through and between ports of entry along the SWB. Figure 3 also illustrates the primary land routes used to smuggle drugs into the country from along the SWB. The majority of the drugs are transported through the ports of entry by vehicles. The air threat, though not as significant as the ground threat, is present and is supported by airstrips, vast flatlands, and sparse population. Land purchases on both sides of the SWB support smuggling operations. Smugglers may be armed with automatic weapons, modern means of communication, and night-vision equipment. Furthermore, smugglers rapidly adapt to success by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and are willing to wait if interdiction is effective. Lastly, the smugglers control the tactical timeline for operations.<sup>5</sup>

The three major drugs smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico are: heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Heroin has been produced in Mexico since the early 1940s. However, Mexico did not become a major supplier of heroin to the U.S. until the 1970s. Established family groups smuggle the Mexican heroin into the U.S. using primarily overland routes. Cocaine is another choice drug trafficked by Mexican smugglers. The major foreign source of marijuana imported into the U.S. continues

# PRIMARY LAND SMUGGLING ROUTES




Figure 3. Southwest Border and Land Smuggling Routes. Source: U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, 1996 Command Briefing, Slide "Primary Land Smuggling Routes" (Fort Bliss, TX: Joint Task Force Six, 1996).

to be Mexico. Mexican smugglers traffic the marijuana in two ways, primarily by vehicle and the remainder by privately owned aircraft.

#### The National Strategies

##### The 1995 National Security Strategy

The 1995 NSS had two major characteristics: engagement and enlargement. From these two characteristics, three objectives were developed: enhancing security, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy. To enhance security the government maintains a strong defense capability. An element of a strong defense capability is a military which is able to respond to many tasks. Of the many tasks, this country's military forces support counterdrug operations. Specifically, U.S. military forces will be called on to fight drug trafficking.

##### The 1995 National Military Strategy

The 1995 NMS was derived from the NSS. The NMS is characterized by flexible and selective engagements. From these two characteristics, the NMS developed the two national military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. To accomplish the two objectives military forces have three tasks. One is peacetime engagement. Within the task of peacetime engagement is the requirement for U.S. military forces to conduct counterdrug operations. Specifically, the armed forces, working in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies, will use all means authorized by the president and the Congress to halt the flow of illegal drugs into this country.<sup>8</sup>

##### The 1994 National Drug Control Strategy

The 1994 National Drug Control Strategy had twelve goals which are enumerated in appendix A. Goals nine, ten, and eleven deal with the

fight against the trafficking of illegal drugs. Goal nine is to "Reduce domestic drug-related crime and violence."<sup>9</sup> An objective of this goal is to "Coordinate a comprehensive Federal, State, and local approach, employing combined task forces as appropriate, in order to ensure that all levels of the trafficking problem are vigorously attacked."<sup>10</sup> Goal ten is to "Reduce all domestic drug production and availability, and continue to target for investigation and prosecution those who illegally import, manufacture, and distribute dangerous drugs and who illegally divert pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals."<sup>11</sup> An objective of this goal is to "disrupt, dismantle, and destroy major narcotics trafficking organizations by interdicting their illicit wares; arresting, convicting, and incarcerating their leaders, members, and associates; and seizing the means and fruits of their illicit activities."<sup>12</sup> Goal eleven is to "Improve the efficiency of Federal drug law enforcement capabilities, including domestic interdiction and intelligence programs."<sup>13</sup> An objective of this goal is to "Identify and implement options, including science and technology options, to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement to stop the flow of drugs along the Southwest border."<sup>14</sup>

#### Organizations Involved in Drug Operations

There are many organizations involved in counterdrug operations. Organizations fall into one of three groupings: (1) federal, (2) regional and composite, or (3) state and local. There are thirty-two federal organizations. Two of the organizations are in the executive branch and the other thirty are divided among nine departments.

The two organizations in the executive branch are the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of National Drug Control Policy

(ONDCP). The function of the NSC is to advise the president on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The ONDCP is the primary agency within the executive branch responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy.<sup>15</sup>

The department with jurisdiction over the military's role in counterdrug operations is DoD. In 1989 the then secretary of defense made the following statement,

I believe that our military forces have the capability to make a substantial contribution toward drug interdiction, and I am instructing them to make the necessary preparations to carry out that responsibility.<sup>16</sup>

Currently the Office of the Secretary of Defense's guidance for executing the national drug control policy has five aspects: source nation support, dismantling the cartels, detection and monitoring, direct support to DLEAs, and demand reduction within the services. Detection and monitoring and direct support to DLEAs are directly related to JTF-6 operations on the SWB. Two specified tasks have been identified for detection and monitoring: first, to refocus activities to emphasize the cocaine threat at border locations, and second, to provide operational and intelligence support. Specified tasks for direct support to DLEAs include providing intelligence analysts, linguists, and support personnel; providing transportation, maintenance, and equipment upgrades; providing engineer and infrastructure support; and continuing support for counterdrug law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in identifying and solving interagency counterdrug command, control, communication, and technical intelligence problems.<sup>17</sup>

Within the DoD, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defense agencies, combatant commands, the military departments (services), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB)

have been assigned counterdrug responsibilities. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)), has been designated the DoD coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (DEP&S).

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides strategic guidance to each regional commander in chief (CINC) for the conduct of counterdrug

operations.<sup>18</sup> There are five defense agencies involved in counterdrug

operations. The agencies and their roles are described below.

1. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA is responsible for producing and disseminating intelligence for the secretary of defense, CJCS, and other major elements of DoD.
2. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). DISA oversees the operation and modernization of the Defense Communication System (DCS), the longhaul voice, data, and record traffic system that supports DoD and selected LEAs.
3. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). DMA supports CD operations by providing traditional and nontraditional mapping products and several digital mapping data bases for geological information and intelligence systems.
4. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). DSAA administers and supervises security assistance planning and formulates and executes security assistance efforts in coordination with other government programs.
5. National Security Agency (NSA). NSA is responsible for providing intelligence, secure communications, and computer security (COMPUSEC).<sup>19</sup>

There are four counterdrug commanders and each has been assigned a specific counterdrug mission. The four are: commander in chief, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM); commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM); and commander in chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps contribute to the counterdrug effort by providing personnel and equipment support to the CINCs for the entire range of DoD mission categories.

USSOUTHCOM's counterdrug mission is to provide support to host-country's development of counterdrug capabilities. Areas of support include but are not limited to materiel, advice, maintenance, and training. Furthermore, it is tasked to patrol, identify, and intercept shipments of chemicals and cocaine. Lastly, it provides data collected from radar and surveillance assets.<sup>20</sup>

USPACOM's counterdrug mission is to provide air and maritime detection and interdiction in the Pacific Ocean. It is tasked to provide support and to develop the counterdrug capabilities of host nations. In Hawaii, it also provides military dog teams to assist DLEAs in the detection of illegal drugs and the eradication of marijuana.<sup>21</sup>

NORAD's counterdrug mission is to monitor and detect suspected drug smuggling operations in the air and on the sea. This is accomplished with a combination of air surveillance radar blimps and AWACS aircraft.<sup>22</sup>

The commander in chief U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) has responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean west of 17 degrees longitude from the north pole to the south pole, extending west into the Pacific Ocean to 92 degrees west longitude. For counterdrug operations the USACOM has responsibility for the land of the continental U.S. and the land, sea, and airspace of Mexico. Subordinate to CINCUSACOM is Forces Command (FORSCOM). FORSCOM has lead operational authority of all SWB and continental U.S. (CONUS) counterdrug operations for USACOM. Within FORSCOM, JTF-6 has responsibility for counterdrug land operations along the SWB in support of Operation Alliance.<sup>23</sup> Figure 4 is a wire diagram of the command relationships within the DoD for counterdrug operations.




Figure 4. Department of Defense Counterdrug Commands. Source: U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, 1996 Command Briefing, Slide "DoD Counterdrug Commands" (Fort Bliss, TX: Joint Task Force Six, 1996).

#### Joint Task Force Six

JTF-6 serves as the planning and coordinating (operational) headquarters providing DoD support to federal, state, and local LEAs along the SWB.<sup>24</sup> The mission of JTF-6 is to provide "Title 10 counterdrug support requested by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in accordance with Office of Secretary Defense

guidance for implementation of the national drug control policy."<sup>25</sup>

Figure five is a wire diagram of JTF-6's organization.

The counterdrug missions that JTF-6 coordinates for between DLEA and DoD forces provides challenging, realistic, and mission essential training for units and individuals. JTF-6 offers six types of support to DLEAs. Intelligence support is provided by individuals who have specialties as intelligence analysts or linguists. Also, units can provide imagery and photographic operations. Operational support can be provided by units conducting both air and ground observation and reconnaissance, aviation operations, diving support, and sensor operations. General support is provided in the form of mobile training teams and communication operations. Engineer support is provided by maintaining and building border roads, fences, lights, training facilities, and bases of operations. A final form of support provided by JTF-6 is rapid support. Rapid support comes in the form of mobile training teams and special reconnaissance. Rapid support is conducted by JTF-6's rapid support unit (RSU).<sup>26</sup>

The RSU is under the tactical control of the commander of JTF-6. It is a Special Forces Company of approximately 70 soldiers which can deploy six teams of 9 to 10 soldiers. Every 90 days the RSU mission rotates between the active duty Special Forces Groups. The RSU provides rapid support to DLEA. Specifically it provides the ability to execute special reconnaissance and instructional expertise in medical, demolitions, weapons, communications, small unit tactics, and land navigation.<sup>27</sup>

The JTF-6's vision for the conduct of counterdrug operations is to serve the nation by tailoring DoD strengths to support DLEAs. It wants to develop joint service professionals who are uniquely skilled




Figure 6. Joint Task Force Six Organization. Source: U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, Command Briefing, Slide "Joint Task Force Six Organization" (Fort Riley, TX: Joint Task Force Six, 1996).

and dedicated as vital contributors to the national drug control effort. The strategy used by JTF-6 to work toward this vision has an established end, ways, and means. JTF-6's desired end-state is to provide support to DLEAs. The ways in which JTF-6 works toward its end is by determining the required action in the correct sequence. This is done by conducting deliberate planning, providing rapid response and intelligence support, coordinating for technology support, and conducting military training. The means used by JTF-6 are the resources needed to support the actions and are provided by the service components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.<sup>28</sup>

History of the Department of Defense's Involvement in Drug Operations

The use of the military has expanded through the years. The following is a selected history of the expansion of the military's role in fighting the country's drug war. This chronology of events is a condensed verbatim version of the chronology of events found on pages one through twelve of An Annotated Bibliography on Military Involvement in Counterdrug Operations, 1980-1990.

- On 1 December 1981, Congress modified the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 to permit the military to play a larger role in counterdrug efforts.
- On 22 March 1982, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued Directive Number 5525.5 giving guidance for DoD components in handling requests for assistance in drug law enforcement (DLE) from federal, state, and local officials in DLE agencies.
- By 31 December 1982, the Department of Defense, acting as a "subcontractor," or "a service provider," was furnishing previously unavailable resources to drug law enforcement agencies at all levels and, at this juncture, had accepted 121 of 126 requests for assistance.
- By 1 July 1983, the DoD had approved 436 of 453 requests for assistance from drug law enforcement agencies.
- On 1 January 1984, the Army recalled Lieutenant General (LTG) R. Dean Trice, USA (Ret), to active duty to head the DoD Task Force on Drug Law Enforcement.

- By 31 December 1984, the U.S. Air Force was strongly involved in assisting civilian drug law enforcement.
- On 15 January 1986, the DoD republished its Directive 5525.5, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," to incorporate into its guidance the recent changes in the laws.
- In August 1988, the DoD coordinated the commitment of National Guard units of four states to work with the U.S. Customs Service in inspecting cargo entering the United States.
- On September 1988, the president signed into law the DoD's fiscal year 89 National Defense Authorization Act, which assigned certain counterdrug tasks to the DoD under Title XI.
- On 6 January 1989, the secretary of defense issued policy guidelines (defense guidance) for the implementation of the DoD mission contained in Title XI under the Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 89.
- On 3 February 1989, the secretary of defense passed on an executive Order to theater CINCs to commence detection and monitoring operations.
- On 10 February 1989, the headquarters of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) 4 and 5 became operational.
- On 17 May 1989, the DoD drug coordinator approved \$300 million for the fiscal year 89 DoD counterdrug program.<sup>29</sup>

#### The Legality of Military Counterdrug Operations

##### The Posse Comitatus Act

Congress passed this law in 1878 because during reconstruction in the South after the Civil War military forces were used to enforce civil law. This law is the major limiting factor in the use of military forces in the war on drugs and counterdrug operations. The law restricts the active component military from executing traditional law enforcement actions normally done by police. It prohibits the active component military from conducting search, seizure, arrest, or surveillance activities of civilians in the CONUS.<sup>30</sup>

Title 10, US Code

Chapter 18, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," provides guidelines on interaction to the military, reserve component, and civilian law enforcement agencies. Guidelines are provided in four general areas: direct participation in law enforcement activities, use of information collected during military operations, use of military equipment and facilities, and reimbursement.<sup>31</sup> Like Posse Comitatus, Title 10 prohibits the military from conducting search, seizure, or arrests.

Definitions

A thorough understanding of the counterdrug vocabulary is imperative. The glossary provides a selected list of important words and their definitions.

Delimitations

This research was restricted to determining the force structure of a joint task force that would conduct sustained tactical counterdrug operations in support of DLEA along the SWB. It was restricted to the SWB because it is the only HIDTA which is not a city, but a geographical area that extends over a large distance and currently uses military forces to conduct counterdrug operations. This research does not attempt to solve the legal problems imposed by Posse Comitatus and Title 10. Furthermore, the research does not include a cost benefit analysis between the method used along the SWB and the force structure recommended at the conclusion of this research. Finally, the research did not investigate the political problems that could result from the creation of a joint task force organized to halt the flow of illegal drugs along the SWB.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 99-105.

<sup>2</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), II-1 through II-6.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., III-32 and III-33.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., III-30.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, Command Briefing, Slide "Southwest Border Threat Overview" (Fort Bliss, TX.: Joint Task Force Six, 1996).

<sup>6</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, II-11.

<sup>7</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 8-11.

<sup>8</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), I-iii and 1-9.

<sup>9</sup>National Drug Control Strategy, 68.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 68 and 69.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 69.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 69.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 69.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 69

<sup>15</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, III-2 and III-3.

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, Slide "OSD Guidance."

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., Slide "Office of the Secretary of Defense Guidance" and "Specified Tasks."

<sup>18</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, III-5.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., III-6 and III-7.

<sup>20</sup>Center For Army Lessons Learned, Newsletter 91-4, Counterdrug Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 1991), 3.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>23</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, VI-15 through VI-18.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., VI-15 and VI-16.

<sup>25</sup>U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Six, Slide "Mission."

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., Slide "Types of Support Offered by JTF-6."

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., Slide "Rapid Support Unit-RSU."

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., Slides "JTF-6 Vision" and "JTF-6 Strategy to Support Law Enforcement."

<sup>29</sup>Thomas W. Crouch, An Annotated Bibliography on Military Involvement in Counterdrug Operations, 1980-1990 (Langley Air Force Base: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1991), 1-12.

<sup>30</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, I-7.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., I-7.

CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE SEARCH

This chapter reviews the literature that is currently in publication and addresses the issue of counterdrug operations. The literature reviewed and included in this chapter can be assigned to one of three categories. Category one lists literature that supports the theory that the money spent on counterdrug operations would be better spent if the money was concentrated on the demand side of the drug market. The second category supports the theory that the military's role in counterdrug operations is undefined and can not be well defined. The last category supports the theory that the military's role in counterdrug operations is exactly where it should be, in support of LEAs. Two final pieces of literature reviewed in this chapter are The 1994 National Drug Control Strategy and Joint Publication 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

Drug Control Through Demand Reduction

The first category that literature is assigned believes that efforts to win the war on drugs would be better spent concentrating on the demand side of the drug market. Literature in this category normally looks at the cost to conduct counterdrug operations to stem the flow of drugs into the country. The authors argue that the money would be better spent in education and treatment roles. Furthermore, the authors conclude in this literature that if there is no demand then there will be no reason for drugs to enter the country. In Role of the Military in the Drug War, Have We Exceeded Congressional Intent, a study

project at the United States Army War College in 1992, the author, Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Durden examined the involvement of the Department of Defense in the drug war. The report questioned the role of the military and whether or not the military had taken on roles that Congress never intended. The report concluded that the emphasis of the drug war should shift to reducing demand and so should the military's involvement.<sup>1</sup>

In Blind Ambitions and Political Rhetoric: Why We Need a New Drug Strategy, a 1992 study project report at the Army War College, the author Lieutenant Colonel Shiela R. Helm presented a critical review of the 1992 National Drug Control Strategy. The four strategies presented by President Bush in 1992 are alleged to be the same as those presented by President Reagan. Furthermore, the report asserted that with reduced resources it is impossible to be effective in all four strategies. The report concluded that drug control attention be centered around demand reduction.<sup>2</sup>

In Lost in the Drug Wars: Time for a New Paradigm, a 1993 study project report at the Army War College, the author Lieutenant Colonel Gary C. Carlson presented the issue that the national drug control strategy, then based on controlling drug supply, had neither reduced the number of drug users nor the amount of drugs available. The report concluded with a strategy based on demand reduction, not supply reduction.<sup>3</sup>

In Reshaping the Military Role in the Drug War, a 1993 study project at the United States Army War College, the author Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Curry examined the application of military resources to the three phases of the 1992 National Drug Control Strategy: interrupt the production base in foreign countries, interdict the

transportation of drugs between the source countries and the United States, and eliminate the availability of these drugs in American communities. The study concluded that the use of military power in the three phases has limited success potential. Instead, national drug control strategy needs to be reevaluated with a greater amount of emphasis on the demand side of illegal drugs. The report also concluded that the role of the military in counterdrug operations needed to be reevaluated.<sup>4</sup>

In The Paradoxical and Unintended Effects of the War on Drugs, a 1993 research report at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., the author Lillian E. Fishburne stated that an increase in illicit drug production, peasant support of insurgencies in drug producing countries, increased corruption, and the rise of sophisticated drug trafficking are unintended consequences of the supply side counterdrug approach. The report concluded that demand side reduction strategies in the form of prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation were the answer to the drug control problem.<sup>5</sup>

#### Military's Role in Drug Control is Unclear

The second category that literature is assigned to believes that the role of the military in the war on drugs is still undefined and most likely can not be well defined. Literature in this category uses history to illustrate that the role of the military has been evolutionary. As the flow of drugs continues to escalate, the role of the military will most likely continue to evolve also. However, full-scale use of the military is not discussed in the literature.

In Campaign Planning or the Lack of Campaign Planning and The "Drug War," a 1992 study project report at the Army War College, the author Lieutenant Colonel Stephen K. Cook described how the Department

of Defense found itself involved in a drug war that had no leader, competing demands, competing agencies, and an unclear end state. The report subscribed to a solution found by using the campaign planning process. The report concluded that this process would result in a more clearly defined end state and a more effective and efficient war.

In In Can the Army Expand Its Role in the Domestic Counter-Drug Fight?, a 1992 study project at the Army War College, the author Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Majauskas presented an examination of the military's role in counterdrug operations. The report further examined the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act and the effective use of military resources in counterdrug operations. Lastly, the report attempted to determine the military's role in assisting in domestic counterdrug operations.<sup>7</sup>

In The Drug War: A Military Cure?, a 1993 study report at the Army War College, the author Lieutenant Colonel Gary R. Steimer suggested that the lack of progress in fighting the drug war by the government and law enforcement agencies caused many to believe the solution lay in the use of military forces. The report discussed the sensitive issue of the military as "policemen" and the impact on the military's readiness. The report concluded with three questions that must be addressed prior to the full use of military forces in the counterdrug fight: (1) Should the military be involved in the drug war? (2) What are the possibilities and limitations of military involvement? and (3) What is the military objective?<sup>8</sup>

In An Expanded Drug Interdiction Role for the Military: Policy, Process, and Potential Impact on International Relations, a 1994 master's thesis at the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, the author Eric S. Gartner stated that

drug control requires two approaches, demand reduction and supply reduction. The thesis argued that with regard to supply reduction the military must have an expanded role in drug interdiction, specifically, that the military involvement in border and water interdiction operations should be expanded. Furthermore, it argued that military operations in drug supplying countries should be diminished because of the potentially damaging and unstabilizing effects on the countries' governments.<sup>9</sup>

#### Military's Role is to Support Law Enforcement Agencies

The third category of literature is that the role of the military in the war on drugs is exactly where it should be, in support of law enforcement agencies. Literature in this category reviews, within the context of current law, how units and equipment can best be used to support law enforcement agencies.

In "Against All Enemies - Using Counterdrug Operations to Train for Infantry Wartime Missions," a 1992 monograph at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the author Major Harry E. Johnson examined the issue of a military unit's readiness and support of counterdrug operations. The monograph explained that commanders conducting counterdrug operations can use that time to effectively train unit mission essential tasks and in doing so improve the unit's overall combat readiness.<sup>10</sup>

In U.S. Army Aviation Participation in the Counterdrug Effort, a 1993 study project at the Army War College, the author Lieutenant Colonel William S. Brophy said that only with a national effort that includes all aspects of society, military and civilian, will the drug problem be effectively dealt with. The report specifically said that

the advanced technology, speed, and flexibility of Army Aviation can be used to support LEAs in counterdrug operations.<sup>11</sup>

In The Reconnaissance Squadron in a Counterdrug Interdiction Role, a 1993 master's thesis at the Army Command and General Staff College the author Major William J. Gillen, Jr. examined the environment that active component units must operate in when conducting domestic counterdrug operations. The thesis concluded that the reconnaissance squadron of a light infantry division can effectively support drug interdiction operations along the SWB of the U.S.<sup>12</sup>

#### Summary of The 1994 National Drug Control Strategy

The 1994 National Drug Control Strategy was designed to respond to today's drug use, treat the drug problem, protect children, protect neighborhoods, focus on source countries, and pursue new ideas for drug control. The strategy's response to drug use was treatment to reduce the number of hard-core and casual users by 5 percent each year. Treatment of the drug problem would be handled by increasing the number of hard-core users in treatment by approximately 140,000 each year. Furthermore, the president's health security act would include a guarantee of basic drug treatment services.

Protecting the nation's children is viewed as one of the most important responsibilities of the strategy in order to reverse the increased use of illegal drugs among students. Closely related to protecting the children is protecting neighborhoods. The strategy recognizes that no strategy can be successful if drugs are available on the streets. The strategy included an increase in the number of local law enforcement personnel nationwide by 16 percent over the next five years. The strategy also noted that in protecting the neighborhood all elements of a community must be mobilized in the fight.

In focusing on source countries the strategy is threefold. First, assistance will be provided to host nations to strengthen their counterdrug institutions. Second, the arrest and imprisonment of international drug lords and their organizations will be intensified. Third, aggressive support will be provided to crop control programs. The nation's strategy also calls on the ONDCP to pursue new ideas for drug control. The objective of the committee is two-fold. First, to improve and develop new methods of collecting data. Second, to improve the quality, timeliness, and relevance of current data collection systems. The 1994 National Drug Control Strategy had twelve goals which are enumerated in appendix A.<sup>13</sup>

Joint Publication 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations

The following quote best describes the contents of this document and its intended use.

This publication sets forth doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a timely manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.<sup>14</sup>

Summary

This chapter has reviewed specific literature in publication and addresses the issue of military involvement in counterdrug operations. The literature was divided into three categories. The first category included literature suggesting that the efforts to win the war on drugs would be better spent concentrating on the demand side of the drug

market. The second category included literature stating that the role of the military in the war on drugs is still undefined and most likely can not be well defined. The third category included literature that said the role of the military in the war on drugs is exactly where it should be, in support of law enforcement agencies. Also included in this chapter is a summary of The 1994 National Drug Control Strategy and the purpose of Joint Publication 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

None of this literature addresses the organization of a joint task force, consisting of active and or reserve duty forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps whose mission it would be to conduct sustained counterdrug operations along the SWB of the U.S. in order to interdict the smuggling of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States. The literature review has demonstrated that the concept of creating a joint task force designed to conduct sustained counterdrug operations along the SWB has not been researched and is a topic area which has not been reviewed in the published academic arena. Furthermore, the impact of the literature review is that this may be the first ever paper which looks directly at the types of missions conducted and the forces involved and creates a force which could conduct sustained counterdrug operations.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> LTC Richard L. Durden, Role of Military in the Drug war, Have We Exceeded Congressional Intent (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1992), ii.

<sup>2</sup> LTC Sheila R. Helm, Blind Ambitions and Political Rhetoric: Why We Need A New Drug Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 1992), ii.

<sup>3</sup> LTC Gary C. Carlson, Lost in the Drug Wars: Time for a New Paradigm (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 1993), ii.

<sup>4</sup> LTC Stephen J. Curry, Reshaping the Military Role in the Drug War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1993), ii.

<sup>5</sup> Lillian E. Fishburne, The Paradoxical and Unintended Effects of the War on Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, April 1993), ii.

<sup>6</sup> LTC Stephen K. Cook, Campaign Planning - Or Lack of Campaign Planning - And The "Drug War" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), ii.

<sup>7</sup> LTC Richard R. Majauskas, Can the Army Expand Its Role in the Domestic Counter-Drug Fight? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 1992), ii.

<sup>8</sup> LTC Gary R. Steimer, The Drug War: A Military Cure? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 1993), ii.

<sup>9</sup> Eric S. Gartner, An Expanded Drug Interdiction Role for the Military: Policy, Process, and potential Impact on International Relations (Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1994), ii.

<sup>10</sup> MAJ Harry E. Johnson, Sr., Against All Enemies - Using Counter Drug Operations to Train for Infantry Wartime Missions (monograph: School of Advanced Military Studies, January 1992), ii.

<sup>11</sup> LTC William S. Brophy, U.S. Army Aviation Participation in the Counterdrug Effort (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 1993), ii.

<sup>12</sup> MAJ William J. Gillen, Jr., The Reconnaissance Squadron In A Counterdrug Interdiction Role (MMAS thesis: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1993), ii.

<sup>13</sup> National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 1-6.

<sup>14</sup> Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), iii.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology used to evaluate and analyze data and information gathered during the research to determine the organization of a joint task force, consisting of active or reserve duty forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines whose mission it would be to conduct sustained counterdrug operations to support DLEA interdiction efforts along the SWB. The methodology, used to analyze the fiscal year 1995 support requests completed by DoD forces in support of counterdrug operations along the SWB, was divided into five parts. First, the 816 support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were reviewed to delete from the research all support requests that were not conducted in support of counterdrug operations along the SWB. Second, the support requests were sorted into one of the BOS based on the counterdrug mission conducted. Third, within each BOS the support requests were then sorted into the service component which had completed the mission. Fourth, the total number of man-days was calculated which resulted in the determination of the average number of persons deployed per day by service component within each BOS. Finally, this number provided information as to the type of force structure required from a service component which could conduct sustained counterdrug operations as a subordinate organization of a joint task force along the SWB.

Support Requests Conducted Along the Southwest Border

As previously presented in chapter 1, the SWB states are California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The 816 support requests that were completed in fiscal year 1995 were completed in more than just the four SWB states. Support requests were completed in thirty-eight of the forty-eight continental states. Support requests were also completed in the District of Columbia, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Removing all of the support requests that were not completed in the four SWB states reduced the total number of support requests by 215 from 816 to 601.

JTF-6 Support Services and the Battlefield Operating Systems

JTF-6 is committed to provide responsive and quality support to the SWB DLEA. The objective of military support operations to DLEA along the SWB is to assist in detecting, deterring, and disrupting illegal drug trafficking. Military support operations to a DLEA is provided on a request basis. The DLEA requests military support from Operation Alliance, a federal organization which is charged with coordinating interdiction operations along the SWB. Operation Alliance coordinates the efforts of state and local law enforcement agencies with the efforts of federal law enforcement agencies. On receipt of a request for military support Operation Alliance reviews the request with liaison officers from the National Guard, the regional logistics support office (RLSO), and JTF-6. When a request is validated it is forwarded to JTF-6.<sup>1</sup>

The J-3 of JTF-6 receives the support request from Operation Alliance and the planning process begins. A support request coordinator determines which staff section will be responsible for the support request. From within the appropriate JTF-6 staff section an action

officer is assigned to the support request. If necessary the action officer will coordinate with other JTF-6 staff sections to ensure that all planning process actions are taken. The action officer is responsible for tentatively identifying a military unit which will be responsible for providing the requested support. On completion of a concept for supporting the support request, the request for support is forwarded to commander in chief, Forces Command (CINCFOR). The staff of CINCFOR reviews the request and forwards it to DoD for approval. On approval at DoD, the responsibility of the support request is transferred to the JTF-6 J-3 operations branch for final planning, coordination, and control of the support request.

The type of support that the military provides is not restricted to any specific category. JTF-6 encourages DLEA that if they are not sure what support they need, then JTF-6 suggests that the DLEA tell JTF-6 what it is the DLEA wants to accomplish and JTF-6 will assist in determining the appropriate support package. However, JTF-6 has identified eight general areas of support which can be provided as described in the Joint Task Force-Six User's Guide.<sup>3</sup>

Fused/Analyzed Intelligence

Military intelligence specialists may provide various forms of assistance to help identify trends, techniques, and locations of criminal activity.

Ground Radar or Sensor

Various sensors and surveillance systems may be provided, along with operators to emplace and monitor them.

Airborne Reconnaissance

In some cases fixed or rotary wing aircraft may be provided to assist with reconnaissance of a given area.

Ground/Air Transportation

In most cases it will be preferred to transport prisoners, personnel, equipment, or evidence with your own or with contracted commercial assets. In some cases, however, DoD vehicles or aircraft can be used.

Engineer Operations

Military engineer units may be used to clear vegetation, emplace or remove obstacles, improve roads, do light construction, perform demolition of a condemned facilities and to accomplish other tasks related to drug enforcement activities.

Military Exercises

Military units may be tasked to perform training exercises along the border as a form of area denial.

Ground Reconnaissance

Manned observation posts may observe border crossings, possible remote landing strips, and other suspected areas of international narcotics smuggling activity.

Mobile Training Teams

Military training teams can be requested to provide instruction at your location.

This list of areas in which support can be provided is only a tool to assist DLEA.

The general areas of support listed above resemble in part the seven BOS, which are intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility/countermobility/survivability, air defense artillery, command and control, and combat service support. The following is a brief description of each of the seven BOS, taken from FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, dated October 1985.

intelligence-The product resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information concerning an enemy force, foreign nations, or areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.

maneuver-The movement of forces supported by fire to achieve a position of advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the enemy.

fire support-Assistance to those elements of the ground forces which close with the enemy such as infantry, and armor units, rendered by delivering artillery and mortar fire, naval gun fire, and close air support (CAS). Fire support may also be provided by tanks, air defense artillery, and Army aviation.

mobility/countermobility/survivability-Mobility is obstacle reduction by maneuver and engineer units to reduce or negate the effects of existing or reinforcing obstacles. The objectives are to maintain freedom of movement for maneuver units/weapon systems and critical supplies. Countermobility is the construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the

enemy by reinforcement of terrain. The primary purpose of countermobility operations is to slow or divert the enemy, to increase time for target acquisition, and to increase weapon effectiveness. Survivability is the development and construction of protective positions such as earth berms, dug-in positions, overhead protection, and counter-surveillance means to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapon systems.

air defense artillery-All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy attack by aircraft or guided missiles in flight.

command and control-The exercise of command that is the process through which the activities of military forces are directed, coordinated, and controlled to accomplish the mission. The process encompasses the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures necessary to gather and analyze information, to plan for what is to be done, and to supervise the execution of operations.

combat service support-The assistance provided to sustain combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. It includes administrative services, chaplain services, civil affairs, food services, finance, legal services, maintenance, medical services, supply, transportation, and other logistical services.

The BOS are used in planning operations to ensure that a commander has the necessary forces available to him on the battlefield to synchronize his fight and ultimately win the battle and the war.

As stated before, there is a similarity between some of the general areas of support provided by JTF-6 and the seven BOS. After reviewing completed support requests that were provided by JTF-6 to DLEA, they were assigned to one of the BOS. Since the BOS is a method for creating the force required by a commander to fight a battle, the analysis of the support requests within each of the BOS will assist in determining the organization of the joint task force.

#### Service Component Support

As presented in chapter 1 each of the services within the DoD provides support to counterdrug operations along the SWB. JTF-6 tracks which service component completes a support request. The service components are separated as follows and assigned a code to track

participating services: active Army (AA), active Army FORSCOM (AAF), active Army TRADOC (AAT), active Army Special Operations (AAS), Army Reserve (AR), Army Reserve Special Operations (ARS), Army National Guard (ARNG), Department of Defense (D), active Air Force (FA), Air Force Reserve (FR), Air Force Reserve Special Operations (FRS), Air Force Air National Guard (FG), active Marine Corps (MA), Marine Corps Reserve (MR), active Navy (NA), active Navy Special Operations (NAS), and Navy Reserve (NR). Within each of the BOS the support requests are further sorted by which of the service components completed the support request.

Man-Days and the Average Number Deployed per Day

Each support request completed records the number of personnel involved and the date the mission started and ended. Using the start and end date the length in days for each support request was determined. These two numbers, number of personnel involved and number of days the mission lasted, are then multiplied together to calculate the total number of man-days involved in completing the support request. As an example of this type of calculation, a support request that included 36 soldiers and lasted fifteen days used 540 man-days. By summing the number of man-days for all support requests within a service component the total number of man-days for that service component within each of the BOS can be calculated.

To determine the service component's approximate daily commitment along the SWB the average number of personnel deployed per day was calculated. This value was found by dividing the total number of man-days by the length of the fiscal year, 365 days. The average number of personnel deployed per day is a representation of the required personnel from a specific service component to complete support requests with a certain type of counterdrug mission. This number was always a non-

integer value and because the value represented personnel deployed completing support request missions it was always rounded to the nearest integer value.

#### Force Structure Required

The average number of soldiers deployed was then used to determine the force structure from that service component that could conduct the support request mission. This number was never the exact value of a force structure within that service component. Using service specific tables of organization the closest force structure was assigned. This force structure then represented the force structure required to complete support requests with a specific type of counterdrug mission. In some instances because of the infrequency that a specific type of counterdrug mission was conducted the average daily number of personnel deployed was less than one. In cases where this occurred, it was decided that the service component would not be required to provide a force structure to conduct sustained operations.

This force structure would have as a minimum the personnel strength equal to the average number of soldiers deployed every day. This would require support requests to be completed every day of the year. This would be infeasible, so an assumption had to be made. The assumption was that a force structure could conduct support request missions, requiring the average number of soldiers deployed, for a period of any one month. At the completion of that month, the force structure would have to be replaced by a like force structure to continue completing support request missions requiring the average number of soldiers deployed. This led to a second assumption.

The second assumption was that certain forces would conduct operations using the time management system of red, amber, green. This

would require certain force structures to have three subordinate units each with the same organization having a personnel strength equal or greater than the average number of soldiers deployed. This time management system would require that each subordinate organization have a red, amber, and green month in any quarter. At the end of a quarter, the parent force structure could then begin the rotation of subordinate units again. As an example, suppose the average number of soldiers deployed conducting ground reconnaissance equaled an infantry platoon. Each month of the quarter a different platoon would be completing ground reconnaissance support request missions. The parent force structure of three platoons would be a company. Therefore, to sustain ground reconnaissance support request missions for any one quarter would require an infantry company.

#### Summary

The methodology took 816 support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 in thirty-eight states, D.C., Canada, and Puerto Rico and reduced it to 601 completed in just the four SWB states. It next took the 601 support requests and assigned them by counterdrug mission type to one of the seven BOS. Within each of the BOS, support requests were again divided into the service component that completed the counterdrug mission. The man-days for each support request, the total number of man-days for each service component, and the average number of personnel deployed per day were all calculated. Using the average daily number of personnel deployed a force structure from the service components was selected which could conduct sustained counterdrug operations. This analysis provided a joint task force capable of conducting sustained counterdrug operations to support DLEA efforts to interdict drugs along the SWB.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Six, Joint Task Force-Six User's Guide (Fort Bliss, TX), 1-11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 13-14.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 6-8.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, FM-101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

## CHAPTER FOUR

### ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the analysis of the support request data that was provided by JTF-6. The data was restricted to just fiscal year 1995. The data included 816 separate support requests that had been completed from October 1994 through November 1995. The support requests were first sorted to remove those that were not executed in one of the four SWB states; California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Next, the support requests were sorted by placing them into their related BOS. Table 2 illustrates how the description and the mission type of the support request was used to sort the support requests into the BOS.

Having sorted the support requests into the BOS, the support requests were then sorted within the BOS. To create a picture of the counterdrug operations being conducted the support requests were then sorted by month for each of the BOS. Three of the BOS, fire support, air defense artillery, and command and control did not have any related support request missions.

The sorting by month was accomplished by creating a spreadsheet for each of the twelve months. Across the top of the spreadsheet was the number of days in that month. Down the left hand side were ordinals to assist in tracking the support requests. The support requests were then entered into the spreadsheet. The days in which the support request was active were shaded gray. The description of the mission, the total number of persons involved, and the state in which it was

completed were entered into the spreadsheet. Table 3 illustrates a portion of the maneuver spreadsheet.

TABLE 2

SORT OF SUPPORT REQUEST MISSIONS INTO A  
BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM

Battlefield Operating System	Description/Mission Type
Intelligence	Intelligence Analysts Linguists Sensors Aerial Imagery Photography GS Intelligence Support Radar Operations
Maneuver	Listening Post/Observation Post (LP/OP) Ground Reconnaissance Aviation Reconnaissance Rapid Support Unit
Fire Support	
Mobility/Countermobility/ Survivability	Engineer Training Facility Kennel Construction Engineer Fences Engineer Roads Engineer Assessment Topographic Map Production
Air Defense Artillery	
Command and Control	
Combat Service Support	Aviation Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Aviation Support Operations Ground Transportation Controlled Delivery

The complete spreadsheets for the BOS can be found in their respective appendices: appendix B, Intelligence; appendix C, Maneuver, appendix D, Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability; and appendix E, Combat Service Support.

Within each of the BOS the support requests were further divided by the service component which had completed the mission. Using the number of personnel that conducted the mission and the length of the mission the number of man-days for each support request was calculated. This allowed for a total number of man-days and subsequently the average

number of man-days to be calculated for each of the service components in each of the BOS. The average number of man-days was then used to determine a service component force which could provide that number of personnel.

#### Intelligence

The analysis of the intelligence BOS included three types of support request missions: intelligence analysts, linguists, and intelligence gathering operations. There are three separate spreadsheets in appendix B; the first accounts for the support requests for intelligence analysts, the second for linguists, and the third for intelligence gathering missions dealing with sensors, aerial imagery photography, general support intelligence, radar operations, unmanned aerial vehicle, and intelligence assessments.

#### Intelligence Analysts

In fiscal year 1995 a total of 155 support requests were completed for intelligence analysts. The shortest support request in duration for an intelligence analyst was forty-six days while the longest was 349 days. The average length of time an intelligence analyst was involved in completing a support request was 154 days or approximately five months. The largest number of persons deployed during a support request for intelligence analysts was six while the smallest number of persons deployed was one. The average number of intelligence analysts deployed per support request was 1.3. From these facts a couple of conclusions can be drawn. First, the time commitment to complete a support request for intelligence analysis is months. Furthermore, that the number of analysts per support request indicates this type of support mission is best completed by an individual not a

unit. The support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were completed by five different service components; the active Army, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the active Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Active Army

The active Army completed a total of two support requests for intelligence analysts. In doing so, it used 358 man-days. Therefore, the average number of analysts deployed per day was one. So, the active Army must have an intelligence analyst deployed each month.

#### Army Reserve

The Army Reserve completed a total of ninety support requests for intelligence analysts. In doing so, it used 12,294 man-days. Therefore, the average number of analysts deployed per day was forty-eight. So, the Army Reserve must have forty-eight intelligence analysts deployed each month.

#### Navy Reserve

The Navy Reserve completed a total four support requests for intelligence analysts. In doing so, it used 461 man-days. Therefore, the average number of analysts deployed per day was one. So, the Navy Reserve must have an intelligence analyst deployed each month.

#### Active Air Force

The active Air Force completed a total of ten support requests for intelligence analysts. In doing so, it used 2,124 man-days. Therefore, the average number of analysts deployed per day was six. So, the active Air Force must have six intelligence analysts deployed each month.

Air Force Reserve

The Air Force Reserve completed a total of thirty-eight support requests for intelligence analysts. In doing so, it used 8,624 man-days. Therefore, the average number of analysts deployed per day was twenty-four. So, the Air Force Reserve must have twenty-four intelligence analysts deployed each month.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve completed a total of ten support requests for intelligence analysts. In doing so, the Marine Corps Reserve used 2,916 man-days. Therefore, the average number of analysts deployed per day was eight. So, the Marine Corps Reserve must have eight intelligence analysts deployed each month.

To conduct sustained intelligence analyst operations in support of counterdrug support requests for a period of one month would require a total of eighty-eight deployed intelligence analysts. The support requests would be completed by intelligence analysts from five different service components; the active Army would provide one, the Army Reserve would provide forty-eight, the active Air Force would provide six, the Air Force Reserve would provide twenty-four, the Navy Reserve would provide one, and the Marine Corps Reserve would provide eight.

Linguists

In fiscal year 1995 a total of eighteen support requests were completed for linguists. The shortest support request in duration for a linguist was eighty-one days while the longest was 179 days. The average length of time a linguist was involved in completing a support request was 150 days or approximately five months. The largest number of persons deployed during a support request for linguists was seven while the smallest number of persons deployed was one. The average

number of linguists deployed per support request was 2.6. From these facts a couple of conclusions can be drawn. First, the time commitment for a linguist to complete a support request is months. Furthermore, that the number of linguists per support request indicates this type of support mission is either an individual or two to three man team effort, not a unit effort. The support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were completed by five different service components: the active Army, the Army Reserve, the active Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Active Army

The active Army provided linguists from the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) out of the Defense Language Institute (DLI) to complete one support request. In doing so, it used 174 man-days. Therefore, the average number of linguists deployed per day was less than zero. So, the active Army will not be required to provide a linguist to complete counterdrug support requests.

#### Army Reserve

The Army Reserve completed a total of seven support requests for linguists. In doing so, it used 2,772 man-days. Therefore, the average number of linguists deployed per day was eight. So, the Army Reserve must have eight linguists deployed each month.

#### Active Air Force

The active Air Force completed a total of four support requests for linguists. In doing so, the active Air Force used 1,405 man-days. Therefore, the average number of linguists deployed per day was four. So, the active Air Force must have four linguists deployed each month.

Air Force Reserve

The Air Force Reserve completed a total of four support requests for linguists. In doing so, it used 2,114 man-days. Therefore, the average number of linguists deployed per day was six. So, the Air Force Reserve must have six linguists deployed each month.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve completed a total of two support requests for linguists. In doing so, it used 878 man-days. Therefore, the average number of linguists deployed per day was three. So, the Marine Corps Reserve must have three linguists deployed each month.

To conduct sustained linguist operations in support of counterdrug support requests for a period of one month would require a total of twenty-one deployed linguists. The support requests would be completed by linguists from four service components: the Army Reserve would provide eight, the active Air Force would provide four, the Air Force Reserve would provide six, and the Marine Corps Reserve would provide three.

Intelligence Gathering Operations

In fiscal year 1995 a total of fourteen different support requests were completed for intelligence gathering operations. Four types of missions were conducted; six support requests were completed for imagery, five for sensors, one for general support missions, and two for radar missions. The support requests for intelligence gathering operations were completed by the Department of Defense and eight service components: active Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, active Navy, Navy Reserve, active Air Force, active Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

### Photographic Imagery

In fiscal year 1995 a total of six support requests were completed for photographic imagery. The shortest support request in duration for photographic imagery was eleven days while the longest was 172 days. The average length of time for a photographic imagery support request was ninety-five days or approximately three months. The largest number of persons deployed during a support request for photographic imagery was fifty-seven while the smallest number of persons deployed was seven. The average number of persons deployed per support request was twenty-eight. From these facts a couple of conclusions can be drawn. First, the time commitment to complete a photographic imagery support request is months. Furthermore, the number of persons per support request indicates this type of support mission is best completed by a unit. The support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were completed by three service components; the Army Reserve, the active Navy, and the active Air Force.

#### Army Reserve

The Army Reserve completed one support request for photographic imagery. In doing so, it used 1,204 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was three. So, the Army Reserve will provide three soldiers each month to conduct photographic imagery operations. The unit that provides this support is the Southwest Region Training Site-Imagery (SWRTS-I).

#### Active Navy

The active Navy completed four support requests for photographic imagery. In doing so, it used 5,087 man-days. Therefore, the average number of naval aviators deployed per day was fourteen. The support requests for photographic imagery completed by the active Navy was done

using jet aircraft with photographic capabilities. Using a worst case scenario, an assumption was made that all sorties would be flown by a two seat aircraft. So, the active Navy would fly seven sorties per day which would require fourteen aviators which is exactly the average number of naval aviators deployed per day.

#### Active Air Force

The active Air Force completed one support request for photographic imagery. In doing so, it used 4,818 man-days. Therefore, the average number of airmen deployed per day was thirteen. The support requests for photographic imagery completed by the active Air Force was done using jet aircraft with photographic capabilities. Using a worst case scenario, an assumption was made that all sorties would be flown by a two seat aircraft. So, the active Air Force would fly seven sorties per day which would require fourteen airmen which is one more than the average number of airmen deployed per day.

The forces required to complete sustained photographic imagery operations along the SWB include organizations from the Army Reserve, the active Navy, and the active Air Force. The Army Reserve would provide three soldiers from the SWRTS-I, the active Navy would provide seven photographic imagery sorties per day, and the active Air Force would provide seven photographic imagery sorties per day.

#### Sensors

In fiscal year 1995 a total of five support requests were completed for sensors. The shortest support request in duration for sensors was eleven days while the longest was ninety-nine days. The average length of time for a sensor support request was forty-three days or approximately one-and-a-half months. The largest number of persons deployed during a support request for sensors was fifteen while the

smallest number of persons deployed was ten. The average number of persons deployed per support request was thirteen. From these facts a couple of conclusions can be drawn. First, the time commitment to complete a photographic imagery support request is rounded down to one month. Furthermore, that the number of persons per support request indicates this type of support mission is best completed by a unit. The support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were completed by four service components: the active Army, the Army National Guard, the active Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Active Army

The active Army completed two support requests for sensors. In doing so, it used 826 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was two. A force structure that could complete sensor missions would be a ground surveillance radar (GSR) team. A GSR team has three personnel assigned; a squad leader or ground surveillance system (GSS) sergeant and two GSS operators.<sup>1</sup> This force structure would provide a total of three persons which is one more than the average daily number deployed in fiscal year 1995.

#### Army National Guard

The Army National Guard completed one support request for sensors. In doing so, it used 165 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was less than one. So, the Army National Guard will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained sensor operations.

#### Active Marine Corps

The active Marine Corps completed one support request for sensors. In doing so, it used 550 man-days. Therefore, the average

number of Marines deployed per day was two. The force structure that conducts sensor operations in the Marines is the sensor control and management platoon (SCAMP) which is a subordinate organization within the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The SCAMP is not restricted to platoon operations but can task organize into smaller elements. Therefore, the SCAMP can provide a SCAMP team to conduct sustained counterdrug operations along the SWB.

#### Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve completed one support request for sensors. In doing so, it used 990 man-days. Therefore, the average number of marine Reservists deployed per day was three. The Marine Corps Reserves also have the SCAMP. Therefore, the Marine Corps Reserve SCAMP can provide a SCAMP team to conduct sustained counterdrug operations along the SWB.

The forces required to complete sustained sensor operations along the SWB include organizations from the active Army, the active Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve. The active Army would provide a GSR team, the active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve would both provide SCAMP teams.

#### General Support

There was only one support request for general support intelligence. The support request was completed by intelligence personnel from the Department of Defense. In doing so, it used 360 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was one. So, to provide sustained general support intelligence operations the Department of Defense must provide one person each month.

Radar

In fiscal year 1995 a total of two support requests were completed for sensors, one by the Navy Reserve and the other by the Marine Corps Reserve. The Navy Reserve used jet aircraft to conduct radar operations. The Navy Reserve's mission was twelve days in length and had forty-three personnel deployed, for a total of 516 man-days used. So, the average number of aviators deployed per day was one. Making an assumption that the aircraft used to conduct the radar mission is a one seater, to provide sustained radar operations the Navy would have to fly one mission a day. The Marine Corps Reserve used ground based radar to complete its mission. The mission was twenty-eight days in length and included sixteen personnel, for an average daily number of marines deployed of one. The Marines do not have a force structure that has just one Marine capable of conducting ground radar operations. However, within the light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalion there is a target acquisition radar which is organic to the headquarters platoon of each of the firing batteries.<sup>3</sup> A target acquisition radar team can deploy independent of the firing battery and conduct radar operations.

To provide sustained intelligence operations requires forces from all of the service components to conduct missions as intelligence analysts, linguists, or to conduct intelligence gathering operations. Sustained operations would require a total of eighty-eight intelligence analysts and twenty-one linguists. Sustained photographic operations would require Army Reserve forces and aircraft assets from both the Navy and Air Force. To conduct sustained sensor operations requires an active Army GSR team, a Marine radar team from the active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve. Sustained radar operations would require aircraft assets from the Navy Reserve and target acquisition radar from the Marine Corps Reserve.

### Maneuver

The analysis of the maneuver BOS included all support requests for listening posts/observation posts (LP/OPs), ground reconnaissance, aviation reconnaissance, and the RSU. The spreadsheet that illustrates all of these support requests is in appendix C. The analysis to determine the required maneuver forces was divided in three areas; ground operations which included LP/OPs and ground reconnaissance, aviation operations which included aviation reconnaissance, and RSU operations. This analysis will use three assumptions to determine the required force structure. First, when aligning organizations to the average daily number of persons deployed the organization can have a personnel strength greater than the average daily number of persons deployed. Second, the organization will be capable of sustaining the average daily number of persons deployed for a period of one month. Last, an organization will be able to sustain ground operations for only one month of a quarter and so three like organizations will be required to sustain operations for any one quarter of the year.

### Ground Operations

Ground operations in support of counterdrug missions included support requests for LP/OPs and ground reconnaissance. In fiscal year 1995 a total of forty-nine support requests were completed for ground operations. These support requests were completed by five service components: the active Army, the Navy Reserve, the active Air Force, the active Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Active Army

The active Army completed a total of six support requests for ground operations. In doing so, it used 14,990 man-days. The average number of soldiers deployed per day was forty-one. A force structure

that would provide forty-one soldiers a day would be an infantry platoon with an attached mortar squad. The infantry platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, three rifle squads, and a weapons squad. The platoon headquarters has three personnel; a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and a radio telephone operator. Each rifle squad has nine personnel; a squad leader, two fire team leaders, two grenadiers, two automatic riflemen, and two riflemen. The weapons squad has nine personnel; a squad leader, two machine gunners, two ammunition bearers, two antiarmor specialists, and two assistant gunners. The mortar squad has five personnel, a squad leader, a gunner, two ammunition bearers, and an assistant gunner.<sup>4</sup> This force structure would provide a total of forty-three persons which is two more than the average daily number deployed in fiscal year 1995.

#### Navy Reserve

The Navy Reserve completed one support request for ground operations. In doing so, it used 108 man-days. Therefore, the average number of sailors deployed per day was less than one. So, the Navy Reserve will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained ground operations.

#### Active Air Force

The active Air Force completed two support requests for ground operations. In doing so, it used 138 man-days. Therefore, the average number of airmen deployed per day was less than one. So, the active Air Force will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained ground operations.

#### Active Marine Corps

The Marine Corps completed eighteen support requests for ground operations. In doing so, it used 43,472 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marines deployed per day was 119. A force structure that would provide 119 Marines a day would be a Marine rifle company. The rifle company consists of a company headquarters, three rifle platoons, and a weapons platoon. The company headquarters has five personnel; a commander, an executive officer, and four enlisted Marines. A rifle platoon consists of a platoon headquarters and three squads. The platoon headquarters has four personnel; a platoon commander and three enlisted Marines. Each squad consists of thirteen enlisted Marines; a squad leader, two team leaders, two squad automatic rifleman, two rifleman/assistant automatic rifleman and two rifleman. The weapons platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, a machine gun section, a mortar section, and an assault section. The platoon headquarters has a platoon commander and an enlisted Marine. The machine gun section has a section leader and three machine gun squads of seven enlisted Marines each for a total of twenty-two. The mortar section has a section leader and three light weight mortar squads of three enlisted Marines each for a total of ten. The assault section has a section leader and three assault squads of four enlisted Marines each for a total of thirteen. The Marine rifle company would provide a total of 182 Marines which is sevety more than the average daily number of Marines deployed in fiscal year 1995. FY95.<sup>5</sup>

#### Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve completed a total of eight support requests for ground operations. In doing so, it used 12,771 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marine Reservists deployed per day was

thirty-five. A force structure that would provide thirty-five Marine reservists a day would be a Marine rifle platoon. The rifle platoon would have the same organization as the rifle platoon presented previously. The Marine Reserve rifle platoon would provide a total of forty-three Marines which is eight more than the average daily number of Marine reservists deployed in fiscal year 1995.

#### Rapid Support Unit

Each quarter of fiscal year 1995 an active Army Special Forces B-Team acted as the RSU for JTF-6. However, the RSU was never a full strength B-Team. This required additional special operations forces to conduct RSU operations. Specifically, additional active Army special operations forces completed six support requests. In doing so, it used 1,349 man-days. Therefore, the average daily number of additional Army special operations forces deployed was four. Furthermore, active Navy special operations forces completed one support request. In doing so, it used 546 man-days. Therefore, the average daily number of Navy special operations forces deployed was two. These two service components on average provided six additional special operations personnel in support of daily counterdrug missions completed by the RSU. This would not have been required had the RSU been the proper force structure. A Special Forces B-Team consists of a company headquarters and six Special Forces operational detachments, A-Teams. The company headquarters has eleven personnel; a commander, an executive officer, a company technician, and eight senior enlisted soldiers. Each of the A-Teams has twelve personnel; a commander, detachment technician, and ten senior enlisted personnel. A Special Forces B-Team would provide

eighty-three soldiers which is more than any of the four fiscal year 1995 RSU force strengths and the six additional special operations personnel.<sup>6</sup>

To conduct sustained ground operations in support of counterdrug support requests for a period of one month would require an infantry platoon augmented with a mortar squad from the Army, a rifle company from the Marine Corps and a rifle platoon from the Marine Corps Reserves. To conduct sustained ground operations in support of counterdrug support requests for a three-month quarter would require three infantry platoons, three mortar squads, three Marine rifle companies and three Marine Reserve rifle platoons. The three infantry platoons and three mortar squads from the Army is the equivalent of an infantry rifle company. The three Marine companies are equivalent to a Marine infantry battalion. The Marine Reserve rifle platoons would each come on active duty for a period of one month and be placed under the tactical control of the Marine infantry battalion. Therefore, the force structure required to conduct sustained counterdrug ground operations during any quarter of a fiscal year would include an infantry company from the Army, a Marine Corps infantry battalion, three separate Marine Corps Reserve rifle platoons, and a Special Forces B-Team.

#### . Aviation Operations

Aviation operations in support of counterdrug missions included support requests for aviation reconnaissance. In fiscal year 1995 a total of forty-three support requests were completed for aviation operations. These support requests were completed by six service components: the active Army, the Army Reserve, the active Navy, the Navy Reserve, the active Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

Active Army

The active Army completed a total of eleven support requests for aviation operations. In doing so, it used 16,159 man-days. Therefore, the average number of aviators deployed per day was forty-four. A force structure that would provide forty-four aviators a day would be an attack helicopter company and either the aeroscout platoon or the attack helicopter platoon from an air reconnaissance troop. This organization would provide a company headquarters for command and control purposes and includes three personnel; a company commander, safety officer, and first sergeant. Organic to the company would be an aeroscout platoon and an attack helicopter platoon. The aeroscout platoon has a platoon leader, two warrant officers and nine enlisted personnel. The aeroscout has four observation helicopters, OH-58A, with which to conduct aviation reconnaissance missions. The attack helicopter platoon has a platoon leader, ten warrant officers and seven enlisted personnel. The attack helicopter platoon has six attack helicopters, AH-64A, with which to conduct aviation reconnaissance missions.<sup>7</sup> The attack helicopter company would be augmented by an aeroscout Platoon or an attack helicopter Platoon from an air reconnaissance troop.

The aeroscout platoon of an air reconnaissance troop has a platoon leader, four warrant officers and thirteen enlisted personnel. The aeroscout platoon has six observation helicopters, OH-58A, with which to conduct aviation reconnaissance missions. The attack helicopter platoon of an air reconnaissance troop has a platoon leader, six warrant officers and five enlisted personnel. The attack helicopter platoon has four attack helicopters, AH-1S, with which to conduct aviation reconnaissance.<sup>8</sup>

The attack helicopter company with the aeroscout platoon would have a total strength fifty-one personnel; four commissioned officers, seventeen warrant officers, and thirty enlisted personnel. Furthermore, the company would have a total of sixteen helicopters with which to complete support requests. The attack helicopter company with the attack helicopter platoon would have a total strength of forty-five personnel; four commissioned officers, nineteen warrant officers, and twenty-two enlisted personnel. Furthermore, the company would have a total of fourteen helicopters with which to complete support requests. The attack helicopter company augmented with an aeroscout platoon would provide fifty-one personnel which is seven more than the average daily number deployed in fiscal year 1995. The attack helicopter company augmented with an attack helicopter platoon would provide forty-five personnel which is one more than the average daily number deployed in fiscal year 1995.

#### Army Reserve

The Army Reserve completed ten support requests for aviation operations. In doing so, it used 269 man-days. Therefore, the average number of reserve aviators deployed per day was less than one. So, the Army Reserve will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained aviation operations.

#### Active Navy

The active Navy completed thirteen support requests for aviation operations. In doing so, it used seventy-one man-days. Therefore, the average number of sailors deployed per day was less than one. So, the active Navy will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained aviation operations.

Navy Reserve

The Navy Reserve completed three support requests for aviation operations. In doing so, it used 113 man-days. Therefore, the average number of reserve sailors deployed per day was less than one. So, the Navy reserve will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained aviation operations.

Active Marine Corps

The active Marine Corps completed three support request for aviation operations. In doing so, it used sixty man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marines deployed per day was less than one. So, the active Marine Corps will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained aviation operations.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve completed three support requests for aviation operations. In doing so, it used 290 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marine Corps reservists deployed per day was less than one. So, the Marine Corps Reserve will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained aviation operations.

Therefore, to conduct sustained aviation operations in support of counterdrug support requests for a period of one month would require an Army attack helicopter company augmented by either the aeroscout platoon or the attack helicopter platoon from an air reconnaissance troop. To conduct sustained aviation operations in support of counterdrug support requests for a three-month quarter would require three attack helicopter companies, and either two aeroscout platoons or two attack helicopter platoons from air reconnaissance troops. The three attack helicopter companies is the equivalent of an attack helicopter battalion. The two aeroscout platoons and two attack

helicopter platoons are the equivalent of two air reconnaissance troops. So, the force structure required to conduct sustained aviation operations for any quarter of a fiscal year would be an attack helicopter battalion and two air reconnaissance troops.

The force structure required to conduct sustained counterdrug operations to complete support requests for maneuver type missions for a quarter of any fiscal year would require a Marine infantry battalion, an Army infantry company, an Army attack helicopter battalion, two Army air reconnaissance troops, and three Marine Corps Reserve rifle platoons.

#### Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The analysis of the mobility/countermobility/survivability BOS included all support requests for any type of engineer mission. The spreadsheet that illustrates all of these support requests is in appendix D. These support requests were completed by six service components: the active Army, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Active Army

The active Army completed ten support requests for engineer missions. In doing so, it used 31,733 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Army engineers deployed per day was eighty-seven. A force structure that would provide eighty-seven engineers a day would be an engineer company of an engineer combat battalion (heavy). This organization would provide a company headquarters for command and control purposes and includes two officers and thirteen enlisted personnel who provide administrative and logistical support to the company. It also has an organic maintenance section of twenty-one personnel who provide immediate maintenance support to the organic

equipment of the company. The company has three platoons; a horizontal platoon and two general construction platoons. The horizontal platoon has one officer and thirty-eight enlisted soldiers assigned. The platoon has a headquarters section, an embanking section, a grading and compacting section, and an excavating section. The general construction platoons each have one officer and thirty-eight enlisted soldiers assigned. The construction platoons each have a platoon headquarters and three general construction squads. This force structure would provide a total of 153 engineers which is sixty-six more than the average daily number of engineers deployed in fiscal year 1995.

#### Army Reserve

The Army Reserve completed twenty support requests for engineer missions. In doing so, it used 149 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Army reserve engineers deployed per day was less than one. So, the Army Reserve will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained engineer missions.

#### Army National Guard

The Army National Guard completed three support requests for engineer missions. In doing so, it used 7,812 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Army National Guard engineers deployed per day was twenty-one. A force structure that would provide twenty-one Army National Guard engineers a day could be either a horizontal construction platoon or a general construction platoon from an engineer company of an Army National Guard engineer combat battalion (heavy). The organization of these platoons would be the same as those presented previously. The decision as to which type of engineer platoon would be brought on active duty might be dependent on the types of support requests which have been

received by JTF-6. Whichever type of platoon is selected the total number of engineers would be thirty-nine which is eighteen more than the average daily number of Army National Guard engineers deployed in fiscal year 1995.

#### Air Force Reserve

The Air Force Reserve completed three support requests for engineer missions. In doing so, it used 3,888 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Air Force Reserve engineers deployed per day was eleven. A force structure that would provide eleven Air Force Reserve engineers would be a reserve civil engineer squadron (CES). The CES is not organized into subordinate sections such that a force structure of eleven personnel can be identified. Instead, the CES would tailor the force dependent upon the missions it would be completing. So, the Air Force Reserve would provide a mission structured force of eleven personnel.

#### Active Marine Corps

The active Marine Corps completed two support requests for engineer missions. In doing so, it used 427 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marine Corps engineers deployed per day was just greater than one. The Marine Corps does not have an engineer force structure that has only one engineer in the organization. So, the Marine Corps will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained engineer missions.

#### Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve completed three support requests for engineer missions. In doing so, it used 1,770 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marine Corps Reserve engineers deployed per day was

five. A force structure that would provide five Marine Corps Reserve engineers would be engineer support battalion from within a Marine division. The engineer support battalion has both horizontal and vertical construction units. Dependent on the mission it would deploy a engineer squad which is more than the average daily number of Marine engineers deployed in fiscal year 1995.

To conduct sustained engineer missions in support of counterdrug support requests for a period of one month would require an engineer company of an engineer combat battalion (heavy) from the Army, either a horizontal construction platoon or general construction platoon of an engineer company from the Army National Guard, a mission structured force of eleven personnel from the Air Force reserve, and a vertical or horizontal engineer squad from the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Combat Service Support

In fiscal year 1995 a total of thirty-nine different support requests were completed for combat service support operations. Six types of missions were conducted; seven support requests were completed for aviation medical evacuation, nineteen for aviation support, two for communications, seven for controlled delivery, three for ground transportation, and one for maintenance. The spreadsheet that illustrates all of these support requests is in appendix E. The support requests for combat service support operations were completed by the Department of Defense and seven of the service components: active Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, active Air Force, Air Force Reserve, active Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Aviation Medical Evacuation

In fiscal year 1995 a total of seven support requests were completed for aviation medical evacuation. The shortest support request

in duration for aviation medical evacuation was twenty days while the longest was forty-one days. The average length of time for a aviation medical evacuation support request was twenty-eight days or approximately one month. The largest number of persons deployed during a support request for aviation medical evacuation was thirteen while the smallest number of persons deployed was four. The average number of persons deployed per support request was seven. From these facts a couple of conclusions can be drawn. First, the time commitment to complete an aviation medical evacuation support request is rounded up to one month. Furthermore, that the number of persons per support request indicates this type of support mission is best completed by a small evacuation element and not an entire evacuation unit. The support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were completed by four service components: the active Army, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, and the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### Active Army

The active Army completed four support requests for aviation medical evacuation. In doing so, it used 531 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was one. The active Army does not have a force structure of just one person which can provide aviation medical evacuation. Therefore, the active Army will not provide a organization to conduct sustained aviation medical evacuation operations.

#### Army Reserve

The Army Reserve completed one support request for aviation medical evacuation. in doing so, it used 240 man days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was rounded up to one. The Army Reserve does not have a force structure of just one person which

can provide aviation medical evacuation. Therefore, the Army Reserve will not provide a organization to conduct sustained aviation medical evacuation operations.

#### Army National Guard

The Army National Guard completed one support request for aviation medical evacuation. In doing so, it used 520 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was one. The Army National Guard does not have a force structure of just one person which can provide aviation medical evacuation. Therefore, the Army National Guard will not provide a organization to conduct sustained aviation medical evacuation operations.

#### Active Marine Corps

The active Marine Corps completed one support request for aviation medical evacuation. In doing so, it used 114 man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marines deployed per day was less than one. So, the active Marine Corps will not provide a force to conduct sustained aviation medical evacuation operations.

The support requests for aviation medical evacuation from fiscal year 1995 indicate that there is a requirement for that type mission. However, the analysis does not arrive at a force structure to accomplish the mission. Instead, the analysis indicates individuals from three service components are required. This suggests that the analysis of the support requests might be better served if they were consolidated. Looking at all seven support requests for aviation medical evacuation, a total of 1,405 man-days were used. Therefore, the average number of personnel deployed per day is four. An air ambulance helicopter from the air ambulance company of an evacuation battalion has a crew of four. Therefore, each month of a quarter a different component, active Army,

Army Reserve, Army National Guard, would provide an air ambulance helicopter to conduct sustained aviation medical evacuation operations.<sup>10</sup>

#### Aviation Support

In fiscal year 1995 a total of thirteen support requests were completed for aviation support. The shortest support request in duration for aviation support was one day while the longest was 181 days. The average length of time for an aviation support support request was twenty-six days or approximately one month. The largest number of persons deployed during a support request for aviation support was 162 while the smallest number of persons deployed was four. The average number of persons deployed per support request was thirty-six. From these facts a couple of conclusions can be drawn. First, the time commitment to complete an aviation support support request is rounded up to one month. Furthermore, that the number of persons per support request indicates this type of support mission is best completed by an aviation unit. The support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were completed by four service components: the active Army, the Army Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and the Marine Corps.

#### Active Army

The active Army completed five support requests for aviation support. In doing so, it used 10,584 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was twenty-nine. A force structure that would provide twenty-nine aviators a day would be two aviation support platoons from an assault helicopter company. Each platoon has a platoon leader, eight warrant officers, and six enlisted persons, for a total of fifteen. Each platoon has five utility helicopters, UH-60.

So, two platoons would provide a total of thirty personnel and ten helicopters. This organization provides one more person than required by the average daily number deployed.<sup>11</sup>

#### Army Reserve

The Army Reserve completed four support requests for aviation support. In doing so, it used 1,226 man days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was three. A force structure that would provide three aviators a day would be a UH-60 crew. The crew of a UH-60 has three personnel: pilot, copilot, and crew chief. An Army Reserve UH-60 helicopter crew would provide three personnel which is exactly the required average daily number of aviators deployed.

#### Air Force Reserve

The Air Force Reserve completed three support requests for aviation support. In doing so, they used 977 man-days. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was rounded up to three. So, the Air Force Reserve will provide one utility type aircraft with a minimum crew strength of three.

#### Active Marine Corps

The active Marine Corps completed one support request for aviation support. In doing so, it used seven man-days. Therefore, the average number of Marines deployed per day was less than one. So, the active Marine Corps will not provide a force to conduct sustained aviation support operations.

The forces required to complete sustained aviation support operations along the SWB include organizations from the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve. The active Army would provide

two support helicopter platoons, the Army Reserve would provide one UH-60 helicopter with crew, and the Air Force Reserve would provide one utility type aircraft with a minimum crew strength of three.

#### Communications

There were only two support requests for communications support. One of the support requests was completed by the active Air Force and the other by the Department of Defense. The active Air Force's support request lasted ten days and included six airmen for a total of sixty man-days used. Therefore, the average number of airmen deployed per day was less than one. So, the Air Force will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained communications operations. The Department of Defense's support requests lasted twenty-seven days and included two personnel for a total of sixty man-days used. Therefore, the Department of Defense will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained communications operations.

#### Controlled Delivery

There were seven support requests for controlled delivery operations. The support requests were completed by the active Air Force. All controlled delivery operations lasted only one day which resulted in an average number of soldiers deployed per day less than one. Therefore, the active Air force will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained controlled delivery operations.

#### Ground Transportation

There were three support requests for ground transportation operations. All of the support requests were completed by the Army Reserve. The average length of a support request was fourteen days and the average number of personnel involved was twenty-four. The total

number of man-days used was 1,867. Therefore, the average number of soldiers deployed per day was five. This value does not equate to a transportation force structure. Furthermore, the ground transportation missions were conducted in three different states and ranged in size of soldiers deployed from two to fifty-eight. The range of the length of the support requests was from five days to thirty-one days. Because of the variance in the completed support requests it is concluded that the Army Reserve will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained ground transportation operations.

#### Maintenance

There was only one support request for maintenance support. The support request was completed by the active Marine Corps. The support request lasted twelvedays and included twelve Marines for a total of 144 man-days used. Therefore, the average number of Marines deployed per day was less than one. So, the active Marine Corps will not provide a force structure to conduct sustained maintenance operations.

To provide sustained combat service support operations requires forces to complete aviation medical evacuation and aviation support operations along the SWB. For aviation medical evacuation the active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard would take turns providing an air ambulance helicopter for one month. For aviation support operations the active Army would provide two support helicopter platoons, the Army Reserve would provide one UH-60 helicopter with crew, and the Air Force Reserve would provide one utility type aircraft with a minimum crew strength of three. The other missions conducted within the combat service support BOS, communications, controlled delivery, ground transportation, and maintenance did not use enough man hours to require

a committed force. Therefore, the current method for having those type of support request missions completed is best left in place.

#### Summary

The analysis of the fiscal year 1995 support requests completed by DoD forces in support of counterdrug operations along the SWB was divided into five parts. First, the 816 support requests completed in fiscal year 1995 were reviewed to delete from the research all support requests not conducted in support of counterdrug operations along the SWB. Second, the support requests were sorted into one of the BOS based on the counterdrug mission conducted. Third, within each BOS the support requests were then sorted into the service component which had completed the mission. Fourth, the total number of man-days was calculated which resulted in the determination of the average number of persons deployed per day by service component within each BOS. Finally, this number provided information as to the type of force structure required from a service component which could conduct sustained counterdrug operations as a subordinate organization of a joint task force along the SWB.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Department of the Army, TOE Handbook 34285L-CTH, Commanders' TOE Handbook Military Intelligence Battalion, Heavy Division (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 174-185.

<sup>2</sup> Department of the Navy, FMFRP 1-11, Fleet Marine Force Organization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 7-8.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 5-18 through 5-21.

<sup>4</sup> Department of the Army, TOE Handbook 07075L-CTH, Commanders' TOE Handbook Infantry Battalion, Infantry Division (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 135-145.

<sup>5</sup> Department of the Navy, FMFRP 1-11, Fleet Marine Force Organization-1992, 4-6 through 4-10.

<sup>6</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 7-7 through 7-9.

<sup>7</sup> Department of the Army, TOE Handbook 01385L-CTH, Commanders' TOE Handbook Attack Helicopter Battalion (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 196-223.

<sup>8</sup> Department of the Army, TOE Handbook 17385L-CTH, Commanders' TOE Handbook Cavalry Squadron, Division Aviation Brigade, Heavy Division (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 203-217.

<sup>9</sup> Department of the Army, TOE Handbook 05415L-CTH, Commanders' TOE Handbook Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 145-165.

<sup>10</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-10, Combat Service Support (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 3-9.

<sup>11</sup> Department of the Army, TOE Handbook 01303L-CTH, Commanders' TOE Handbook Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) and (UH-60) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 82-114.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research was to determine the organization of a joint task force, consisting of active and or reserve forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps whose mission it would be to provide sustained counterdrug operations to support the DLEA efforts to interdict the flow of illicit drugs along the SWB. The conclusion of this research is that a brigade-sized joint task force consisting of both active and reserve forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps could conduct sustained counterdrug operations to support DLEA efforts to interdict the flow of illicit drugs along the SWB. Figure 6 illustrates the service components within each of the services under the brigade size joint task force.




Figure 6. Service Components Contributing to the Joint Task Force

Army Forces

The Army would be required to provide forces from the active Army, Reserves, and National Guard. The active Army would provide an intelligence analyst, a ground surveillance radar squad, an infantry company, a Special Forces B-Team, an attack helicopter battalion, a combat heavy engineer battalion, an assault helicopter battalion, two air reconnaissance troops, and an air ambulance helicopter. Each month one of the GSR teams would deploy. The infantry company would deploy one platoon with a mortar squad each month to conduct counterdrug missions. The Special Forces B-Team would serve as the joint task force's RSU. The attack helicopter battalion would deploy one attack helicopter company each month to conduct counterdrug missions. The attack helicopter company would be augmented by one of the aeroscout platoons or both of the attack helicopter platoons from the air reconnaissance troops. The combat heavy engineer battalion would deploy one engineer company each month. The assault helicopter battalion would deploy an assault helicopter company each month. One month out of each quarter the air ambulance helicopter would deploy. Each month the Army Reserve would deploy 48 intelligence analysts and eight linguists. The Army Reserve would also provide an air ambulance helicopter one month out of a quarter. Lastly the Army reserve would provide imagery collection assets each month. The Army National Guard would provide an engineer platoon each month to the joint task force. Additionally, the Army National Guard would provide an air ambulance helicopter one month out of each quarter. Figures 7, 8, and 9 illustrate possible wire diagrams for the organization of active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard forces respectively of the joint task force required to conduct sustained counterdrug operations.




Figure 7. Active Army Force's Contributing to the Joint Task Force




Figure 8. Army Reserve Forces Contributing to the Joint Task Force




Figure 9. Army National Guard Forces Contributing to the Joint Task Force

#### Navy Forces

The active Navy would provide aviation assets to conduct imagery collection. Each month active Navy aircraft would fly seven photographic imagery collection sorties. The Navy Reserve would provide intelligence analysts and assets to conduct radar operations. Each month one intelligence analyst from the Navy Reserve would be deployed.

Furthermore, Navy Reserve aircraft would fly one radar sortie per day. Figure 10 illustrates a possible wire diagram for the organization of Navy forces of the joint task force required to conduct sustained counterdrug operations.




Figure 10. Navy Forces Contributing  
to the Joint Task Force

#### Air Force Forces

The active Air Force would provide intelligence analysts, linguists, and aviation assets to conduct imagery collection. Each month six active Air Force intelligence analysts would deploy along with four linguists. Furthermore, active Air Force aircraft would fly seven photographic imagery collection sorties. The Air Force reserve would provide intelligence analysts, linguists, and engineer assets. Each month twenty-four Air Force Reserve intelligence analysts and six linguists would deploy. Also an Air Force Reserve engineer team would deploy each month. Figure 11 illustrates a possible wire diagram for the organization of Air Force forces of the joint task force required to conduct sustained counterdrug operations.




Figure 11. Air Forces Contributing to the Joint Task Force

#### Marine Corps Forces

The active Marine Corps would provide sensor support and an infantry rifle battalion. The sensor support would be provided by a SCAMP platoon. Each month the SCAMP platoon would deploy a SCAMP team to conduct counterdrug operations. The infantry rifle battalion would deploy one rifle company each month to conduct counterdrug missions. The Marine Corps Reserve would provide intelligence analysts, linguists, sensor and radar support, and an infantry rifle platoon. Each month eight intelligence analysts and three linguists from the Marine Corps Reserve would deploy. Furthermore, each month the Marine Corps Reserve would deploy a SCAMP team, a target acquisition radar team, an infantry rifle platoon, and an engineer squad. Figure 12 illustrates a possible wire diagram for the organization of Marine Corps forces of the joint task force required to conduct sustained counterdrug operations.




Figure 12. Marine Corps Forces Contributing to the Joint Task Force

#### Recommended Future Research Topics

In chapter 1, the delimitations of this research were presented. Not all, but a few of those delimitations should be researched and the impact of that research on this research investigated. Specifically, the following issues from the delimitations should be investigated.

A cost benefit analysis should be conducted to determine which method, the current means for completing support requests or the conclusion of this research, is greater. This analysis should not just include a monetary evaluation but also possibly evaluate the responsiveness, interdiction results, and training value of each method.

The creation of the joint task force is based on past support requests. Because of this, both methods deploy the same average number of personnel conducting operations along the SWB per day. However, the establishment of a committed joint task force with the mission of providing tactical interdiction support to DLEA along the SWB could possibly create political ramifications between the U.S. and the Mexican governments. The possible political ramifications of such a joint task force should be investigated.

During the research process a number of other research topics were identified that are related to this research. Possible areas of research are presented below.

Research could be conducted to investigate the impact that this joint task force would have on port of entry smuggling operations. It is possible that success on the part of the joint task force would result in an increased amount of smuggling through the ports of entry. Currently, port of entry searches have had to be decreased because of budget problems. Transportation companies with known smuggling records are not even being stopped at the border to be searched because of manpower shortages.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the effect could be that the success of the joint task force could actually lead to a greater amount of drugs getting across the border through the ports of entry. The research should then attempt to answer the question, would more drugs actually enter the country as a result of success by the joint task force in supporting DLEA efforts to interdict drugs along the SWB and between the ports of entry?

Research could be conducted to investigate the creation of a buffer zone on each side of the border. The U.S. and Mexico would be responsible for controlling their respective side of the border within the buffer zone. The buffer zone on the U.S. side might include a border patrol operation by military forces, which the military has been involved in before. The buffer zone could be operated much like the one-kilometer zone was in Germany. Military forces might even be given the authority to conduct search, seizure and apprehension.

Research could be conducted to investigate the creation of a Law Enforcement Reaction Force (LERF) that would fall under the command and control of the joint task force commander. The LERF would be positioned at the joint task force headquarters to provide responsive law

enforcement. The LERF would deploy to conduct search, seizure, and apprehension when a military force discover an ongoing illegal operation.

Last, research could be conducted to investigate the creation of a Law Enforcement Brigade (LEB). The LEB would look and act like a military force. However, the LEB would have the authority to conduct search, seizure, and apprehension. The LEB would have the mission to conduct sustained counterdrug operations along the Southwest Border.

#### Summary

The war on drugs is a war this country can not stand to loose. The impact of drugs on our society are numerous and they reach far into the fabric of this great nation. The drugs that are produced outside of this country flow into it through six HIDTAs. The only HIDTA that covers an extended land area is the SWB. This large open area is easily traversed by those who wish to smuggle in illegal drugs. This country's elements of national power are available to provide sustained support DLEA efforts to interdict drugs along the SWB. One of those elements of national power is the military. Currently, the military provides support to the DLEA when the DLEA submits a request and a military unit volunteers to complete the support request. This method of support is not in keeping with the doctrine which describes domestic support operations. All other domestic support operations which are conducted by military forces are directed by the National Command Authority(NCA).<sup>2</sup> It is time that the NCA direct the establishment of an military force to provide tactical counterdrug missions to support the DLEA efforts to interdict drugs along the SWB. The joint task force designed in this research could be such a military force.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Trevor Armbrister, "Our Drug-Plagued Mexican Border." Reader's Digest (January 1996), 53-58.

<sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 1-4.

## GLOSSARY

Air smuggling event. In counterdrug operations, the departure of a suspected drug smuggling aircraft, an airdrop of drugs, or the arrival of a suspected drug smuggling aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Arrival zone. In counterdrug operations, the area in or adjacent to the United States where smuggling concludes and domestic distribution begins. By air, an airstrip, by sea, an off load point on land, or transfer to small boats. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Counterdrug nonoperational support. Support provided to law enforcement agencies/host nations which includes loan or lease of equipment without operators, use of facilities (such as buildings, training areas and ranges), training conducted in formal schools, transfer of excess equipment, or other support provided by the services from forces not assigned or made available to the combatant commanders. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Counterdrug operational support. Support to host nations and drug law enforcement agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, provided by the theater combatant commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to them by the services for this purpose. Operations support does not include support in the form of equipment alone, nor the conduct of joint law enforcement investigations with cooperating civilian law enforcement agencies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Counterdrug operations. Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Drug interdiction. The interception of illegal drugs smuggled by air, sea, or land. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Interagency coordination. In counterdrug operations, the coordination that takes place among DOD, law enforcement agencies, and the national intelligence agencies in support of the DOD mission to detect and monitor drug trafficking activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Law enforcement agency. Non-DOD government agency chartered and empowered to enforce laws in the following jurisdictions: The United States, a state (or political subdivision) of the United States, a territory or possession (or political subdivision) of the United States, or to enforce U.S. laws within the borders of a host nation. Also called LEA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National military strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (Joint Pub 3-0)

National security strategy. The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (Joint Pub 3-0)

Posse Comitatus Act. (18 USC 1385) Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under PL 97-86 to permit increased DOD support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Producer countries. In counterdrug operations, countries where naturally occurring plants, such as coca, cannabis, or poppies are cultivated for later refinement into illicit drugs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Seizures. In counterdrug operations, includes drugs and conveyances seized by law enforcement authorities and drug related assets (monetary instruments, etc.) confiscated based on evidence that they have been derived from or used in illegal narcotics activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Southwest border. Includes San Diego County and Imperial County, California and all municipalities therein; Yuma County, Maricopa County, Pinal County, Pima County, Santa Cruz County, and Cochis County Arizona and all municipalities therein; Hidalgo County, Grant County, Luna County, Dona Ana County, Eddy County, Lea County, and Otero County, New Mexico and all municipalities therein; El Paso County, Hudspeth County, Culberson County, Jeff Davis County, Presidio County, Brewster County, Pecos County, Terrell County, Crockett County, Val Verde County, Kinney County, Maverick County, Zavala County, Dimmit County, La Salle County, Webb County, Zapata County, Jim Hogg County, Starr County, Hildago County, Willacy County, and Cameron County, Texas and all municipalities therein.

Surface smuggling event. In counterdrug operations, the sighting of a suspected drug smuggling vessel or arrival of a suspected drug smuggling vessel. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## APPENDIX A

### GOALS OF THE 1994 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

Goal 1: Reduce the number of drug users in America.

Goal 2: Expand treatment capacity and services and increase treatment effectiveness so that those who need treatment can receive it. target intensive treatment services for hardcore drug-using populations and special populations, including adults and adolescents in custody or under the supervision of the criminal justice system, pregnant women, and women with dependent children.

Goal 3: Reduce the burden on the health care system by reducing the spread of infectious disease related to drug use.

Goal 4: Assist local communities in developing effective prevention programs.

Goal 5: Create safe and healthy environments in which children and adolescents can live, grow, learn, and develop.

Goal 6: Reduce the use of alcohol and tobacco among underage youth.

Goal 7: Increase workplace safety and productivity by reducing drug use in the workplace.

Goal 8: Strengthen linkages among the prevention, treatment, and criminal justice communities and other supportive social services, such as employment and training services.

Goal 9: Reduce domestic drug-related crime and violence.

Goal 10: Reduce all domestic drug production and availability, and continue to target for investigation and prosecution those who illegally import, manufacture, and distribute dangerous drugs and who illegally divert pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals.

Goal 11: Improve the efficiency of Federal drug law enforcement capabilities, including interdiction and intelligence.

Goal 12: Strengthen international cooperation against narcotic production, trafficking, and use.

Goal 13: Assist other nations to develop and implement comprehensive counternarcotics policies that strengthen democratic institutions, destroy narcotrafficking organizations, and interdict narcotrafficking in both the source and transit countries.

Goal 14: Support, implement, and lead more successful enforcement efforts to increase the costs and risks to narcotics producers and traffickers to reduce the supply of illicit drugs to the United States.

APPENDIX B

MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Analysts)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Oct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Nov	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dec	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jan	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Feb	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mar	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Apr	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
May	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jun	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jul	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Aug	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sep	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Length	6	6	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	5	4	5	4	NM
State	TX	TX	TX	CA	AZ	TX	TX	CA	CA	CA	TX	TX	CA	TX						
Oct	1	2	3	4	5	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
Nov	1	1	2	3	4	5	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
Dec	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jan	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Feb	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mar	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Apr	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
May	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jun	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jul	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Aug	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sep	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Length	6	5	5	6	4	6	6	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	6	5	6	6	6	4
State	AZ	CA	AZ	CA	AZ	TX	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	TX								

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Analysts)

	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
Length	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
State	NM	TX	CA	TX	CA															
Oct	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Nov	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Dec	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Jan	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Feb	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Mar	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Apr	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
May	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Jun	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Jul	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Aug	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Sep	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Length	6	5	11	6	4	5	5	6	2	6	6	6	6	5	6	3	6	6	4	
State	CA	TX	CA	TX	CA	CA	CA	CA	TX											
Oct	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Nov																				
Dec																				
Jan																				
Feb																				
Mar																				
Apr	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
May	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jun	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jul	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Aug	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sep	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Length	6	5	5	6	6	5	5	6	2	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
State	CA	TX	CA	TX	CA	AZ	CA	TX	CA	AZ	CA	TX								

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Analysts)

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
Oct																				
Nov																				
Dec																				
Jan																				
Feb																				
Mar																				
Apr	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
May	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jun	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jul	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Aug	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sep	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Length	6	5	5	4	5	6	4	5	6	4	5	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
State	AZ	AZ	AZ	NM	AZ	AZ	TX	TX	CA	TX	TX									
	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120
Length	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	1	1	3
State	TX	CA	CA	CA	CA	TX														

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Analysts)

		121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140
Length	State	AZ	AZ	CA																	
Oct		1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nov		1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dec		1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jan		1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Feb		1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mar		1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Apr		1	3																		
May																					
Jun																					
Jul																					
Aug																					
Sep																					
Length	6	6	4	4	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	4	4	5	6	6	5	5	5	4
State	AZ	CA	CA	TX	TX	NM	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	AZ	TX	TX	TX	TX	AZ	TX	TX	CA
141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155							
Oct		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4												
Nov		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4												
Dec		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4												
Jan		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4												
Feb		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4												
Mar		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4												
Apr																					
May																					
Jun		1																			
Jul		1																			
Aug		1																			
Sep																					
Length	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
State	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Linguists)

	Length	Language	State	TX	TX	TX	CA	CA	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	CA	CA	CA	CA
Oct	1	2	2	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Nov	4	2	1	5	3	4	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dec	4	2	1	5	3	4	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jan	4	1	1	5	3	4	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Feb	4	1	1	5	3	4	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mar	4	1	1	5	3	4	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Apr																		
MAY																		
Jun																		
Jul																		
Aug																		
Sep																		

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Gathering Operations)

**October**

1	Imagery Photo	Aerial Imagery	(7)
2	Sensors	(11)	
3	GS Intelligence Support	(ADP)	(1)
4			
5			
6			
7	Radar Ops	(16) (TX)	

**November**

1	Imagery Photo	(7)	
2	Sensors	(11) (cont.)	
3	GS Intelligence Support	(ADP) (1) (cont.)	
4			
5			
6			
7	Radar Ops	(16) (TX) (cont.)	

**December**

1	Imagery Photo	(7) (cont.)	
2	Radar Ops	(43) (CA)	
3	GS Intelligence Support	(ADP) (1) (cont.)	
4	GS Intelligence Support	(ADP) (1) (cont.)	
5	GS Intelligence Support	(ADP) (1) (cont.)	
6	Imagery Photo	(15) (cont.)	

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Gathering Operations)

**January**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	Imagery Photo (7) (cont.)																													
2	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																													
3	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																													
4	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																													
5	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																													
6	Imagery Photo (15) (cont.)																													

**February**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1	Imagery Photo (7) (cont.)																										
2	Sensors (DEM) (14)																										
3	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																										
4	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																										
5	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																										
6	Imagery Photo (15) (cont.)																										
7	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (5)																										
8	Ground Surveillance Radar (10) (AZ)																										

**March**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	Imagery Photo (7) (cont.)																													
2	Sensors (DEM) (14) (cont.)																													
3	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																													
4	GS Intelligence Support (ADB) (1) (cont.)																													
5	Imagery Photo (15) (cont.)																													
6	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (5) (cont.)																													

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Gathering Operations)

**April**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1	Imagery Photo (7) (cont.)																												
2	Imagery FLIR (D&M) (57)																												
3	Imagery Photo (33)																												
4																													
5																													
6	Imagery Photo (15) (cont.)																												

Imagery Photo (24)

**May**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1																													
2																													
3	Imagery Photo (33) (cont.)																												
4	Imagery Photo (24) (cont.)																												
5																													
6																													

Sensor Assessment (15)

**June**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1																													
2																													
3	GS Intelligence Assessment (12)																												
4	Imagery Photo (33) (cont.)																												
5	Imagery Photo (24) (cont.)																												
6	Sensors (D&M) (10)																												

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (29)

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Intelligence (Gathering Operations)

**July**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

**August**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

**September**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30

APPENDIX C

MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR MANEUVER SUPPORT

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Maneuver

**October**

1	Rapid Support Unit (70)	LP/OP (46) (AZ)	Avn Recon (7) (CA)	Avn Recon (189) (AZ)	Ground Recon (43) (CA)	Pvn Recon (6) (TX)	Dive Opns (7) (IA)
2							
3							
4							
5	LP/OP (51) (NM)						
6							

**November**

1	Rapid Support Unit (70) (cont.)	LP/OP (53) (TX)	Avn Recon (176) (NM)	Avn Recon (4) (CA)			
2	Avn Reco (261) (AZ) (cont.)						
3							
4							
5							
6	Dive opns (7) (IA) (cont.)						

**December**

1	Rapid Support Unit (70) (cont.)	LP/OP (54) (AZ) (cont.)	LP/OP (16) (AZ)	Avn Recon (6) (TX)			
2							
3							
4							

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Maneuver

January											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1											
2											
3											
4											

February											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1											
2											
3											
4											
5											
6											
7											
8											

March											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1											
2											
3											
4											
5											
6											
7											

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	Rapid Support Unit (61) (cont.)										
2	LP/OP (50) (CA)										
3	LP/OP (70) (CA)										
4	Avn Recon (25) (CA)										
5	LP/OP (21) (CA)										
6	LP/OP (77) (AZ)										
7	LP/OP (6) (NM)										
8	LP/OP (6) (NM)										
9	Avn Recon (3) (TX)										
10	LP/OP (41) (NM)										
11	LP/OP (55) (CA)										
12	LP/OP (23) (TX)										
13	LP/OP (45) (CA)										
14	LP/OP (6) (NM) (cont.)										
15	LP/OP (77) (AZ) (cont.)										
16	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
17	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
18	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
19	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
20	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
21	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
22	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
23	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
24	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
25	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
26	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
27	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
28	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
29	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
30	LP/OP (43) (TX)										
31	LP/OP (43) (TX)										

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Maneuver

April											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Rapid Support Unit (68)	LP/OP (76) (CA)										
2											
3											
4 Avn Recon (11) (CA)	LP/OP (30) (TX)										
5 LP/OP (76) (AZ)											
6											
7											

May											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Rapid Support Unit (68) (cont.)	LP/OP (73) (CA)										
2											
3											
4 LP/OP (6) (ME) (cont.)	Avn Recon (112) (AZ)										
5 LP/OP (76) (AZ) (cont.)											
6 LP/OP (38) (CA)											
7											
8											

June											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Rapid Support Unit (68) (cont.)	LP/OP Ground Recon (77) (CA)										
2											
3											
4 LP/OP (6) (ME) (cont.)	Ground Recon (11) (MI)										
5											
6 Ground Recon (96) (CA)	Avn Recon (3) (TN)										
7											
8 LP/OP (43) (CA)											
9											
10											

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 support Requests for Maneuver

July																														
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
2																														
3																														
4																														
5																														
6																														
7	LP/OP	Ground Recon	(77)	(CA)	(cont.)													(WA)												
8																														
9																														
10																														
11																														
12																														
13																														
14																														
August																														
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	Rapid Support Unit	(53)	(cont.)													(WA)														
2	LP/OP	(26)	(WA)	(cont.)													(AZ)													
3	Avn Recon	(8)	(KY)	(cont.)													(AZ)													
4	Avn Recon	(3)	(TN)	(TX)													(TX)													
5	Avn Recon	(3)	(TN)	(TX)													(TX)													
6	Avn Recon	(6)	(TX)	(CA)													(CA)													
7	Ground Recon	(123)	(CA)	(CA)													(CA)													
8	LP/OP	Ground Recon	(15)	(CA)	(CA)													(CA)												
9																														
10	LP/OP	Ground Recon	(60)	(CA)	(cont.)													(CA)												
11	Ground Recon	(103)	(CA)	(cont.)													(CA)													
12	LP/OP	(107)	(AZ)	(cont.)													(AZ)													
13	Avn Recon	(7)	(OK)	(CA)													(CA)													
14	Avn Recon	(15)	(CA)	(CA)													(CA)													

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Maneuver

<b>September</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	Rapid Support Unit (53) (cont.)																														
2	LP/OP (55) (AZ) (cont.)																														
3	Avn Recon (8) (KY) (cont.)																														
4	Ground Recon (124) (CA)																														
5																															
6																															

Avn Recon (20) (CA)

Ground Recon (115) (CA)

APPENDIX D

MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR ENGINEER SUPPORT

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Mobility/countermobility/Survivability

**October**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

1 Road Construction (134) (AZ)

2 Training Facility Construction (7) (NM)

3 Training Facility Construction (7) (TX)

**November**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

1 Road Construction (134) (AZ) (cont.)

2 Assessment (10) (AZ)

3 Training Facility Construction (7) (TX) (cont.)

**December**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Assessment (5) (PA)

Assessment (2) (ME)

GS Engineer Support (0) (CA)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Training Facility Construction (16) (NY)

Assessment (11) (TX)

Range Design (0) (TX)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Training Facility Construction (16) (NY) (cont.)

Assessment (7) (TX)

Range Design (0) (NY)

**January**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

1 Training Facility Construction (16) (NY) (cont.)

Assessment (11) (TX)

GS Engineer Support (0) (CA) (cont.)

TOPO Map Production (40) (TX)

**February**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

1 Range Design (0) (TX) (cont.)

Assessment (7) (TX)

GS Engineer Support (0) (CA) (cont.)

4

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

**March**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	Training facility construction (27) (TX) (cont.)																													
2	Assessment (1) (TX) (cont.)																													
3	GS Engineer Support (0) (CA) (cont.)																													
4	TOPO Map Production (40) (TX) (cont.)																													
5																														
6	Light Design (0) (AZ)																													
7	Assessment (1) (AZ)																													
8	Assessment (3) (PA)																													
9																														

**April**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1	Training facility construction (27) (TX) (cont.)																												
2	Assessment (1) (TX) (cont.)																												
3	GS Engineer Support (0) (CA) (cont.)																												
4	TOPO Map Production (40) (TX) (cont.)																												
5	Light Design (1) (TX) (cont.)																												
6																													
7	Road Assessment (1) (AZ) (cont.)																												
8	Road Assessment (1) (TX) (cont.)																												
9	Construction (7) (WA) (cont.)																												
10	Fences, Roads, Training Facility (15) (CA)																												
11	General Support (29) (CA)																												
12	Training Facility (26) (TX)																												
13	Remodel Training Facility (11) (TX)																												
14	Kennel Construction (TX) (12)																												
15	Building Expansion (10) (TX)																												
16	4 Mile Border Fence (305) (AZ)																												

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

MAY																														
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	Training facility Construction (27) (TX) (cont.)																													
2	Assessment (1) (TX) (cont.)																													
3	GS Engineer Support (0) (CA) (cont.)																													
4	TOPO Map Production (40) (TX) (cont.)																													
5	Road Assessment (1) (TX)																													
6																														
7	Road Assessment (1) (TX) (cont.)																													
8																														
9	Road Assessment (1) (TX)																													
10	Fences, Roads, Training Facility (155) (CA) (cont.)																													
11	General Support (29) (CA) (cont.)																													
12	Training Facility (269) (TX) (cont.)																													
13	Remodel Training Facility (111) (TX) (cont.)																													
14	Kennel Construction (TX) (12) (cont.)																													
15	Building Expansion (10) (TX) (cont.)																													
16	4 Mile Border Fence (305) (AZ) (cont.)																													

JUNE																														
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	
1	Training Facility (27) (TX) (cont.)																													
2																														
3	GS Engineer Support (0) (CA) (cont.)																													
4	TOPO Map Production (40) (TX) (cont.)																													
5																														

Training Facility (32) (ME)

Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

JULY											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Training Facility (27) (TX) (cont.)											
2											
3 GS Engineer Support (0) (AZ) (cont.)											
4 TOPO Map Production (40) (TX) (cont.)											
5											
6											
August											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Training Facility (14) (MT)											
2											
3											
4 TOPO Map Production (40) (TX) (cont.)											
September											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Barriers (25) (WA)											
2											
3											

APPENDIX E

MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

### Distribution of Fiscal Year 1995 Support Requests for Combat Service Support

Distribution of FY 95 Support Requests for Combat Service Support

January											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Computer System Analyst (1) (KS)											
2 Computer Programmer (1) (FL) (cont.)											
3 Computer Repairer (1) (FL) (cont.)											
4 Avn Movement (9) (PR)											
5 Aviation Support (5) (AZ)											
6 Aviation Transportation (7) (TX)											
7 Ground Transportation (4) (KS)											
8 Ground transportation (2) (TX)											
February											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Computer System Analyst (1) (KS)											
2 Computer Programmer (1) (FL) (cont.)											
3 Computer Repairer (1) (FL) (cont.)											
4 Avn Movement (9) (PR)											
5 Aviation Support (5) (AZ)											
6 Aviation Support (9) (AZ)											
7 Ground transportation (2) (MO)											
8 Controlled Delivery (6) (NM)											
9 Controlled Delivery (8) (ME)											
March											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Computer System Analyst (1) (KS)											
2 Computer Programmer (1) (FL) (cont.)											
3 Computer Repairer (1) (FL) (cont.)											
4 Avn Movement (9) (PR)											
5 Aviation Support (5) (AZ)											
6 Controlled Delivery (4) (KY)											
7 Controlled delivery (8) (NE)											

Distribution of FY 95 Support Requests for Combat Service Support

<b>April</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	
1 Computer System Analyst (1) (KS) (cont.)																															
2 Computer Programmer (1) (FL) (cont.)																															
3 Aviation Support (7) (TX)																															
4 Aviation support (4) (CA)																															
5 Ground Transportation (58) (CA)																															
6 Aviation Transport (18) (PR)																															
7 Controlled Delivery (11) (NM)																															
8 Aviation Support (48) (PR)																															
9 Controlled Delivery (12) (WA)																															
<b>May</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1 Communication support (6) (AZ)																															
2 Aviation support (7) (TX) (cont.)																															
3 Aviation support (4) (CA) (cont.)																															
4 Aviation support (4) (CA) (cont.)																															
5 Aerial MEDEVAC (13) (AZ) (cont.)																															
<b>June</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	
1 Computer Programmer (1) (FL)																															
2 Aviation Support (13) (CA)																															
3 Aerial MEDEVAC (12) (CA)																															
4 Controlled Delivery (0) (NM)																															
5 Controlled Delivery (8) (MO)																															

Distribution of FY 95 Support Requests for Combat Service Support

July																															
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
1 Computer Programmer (1) (FL) (cont.)																															
2 Aviation Transportation (0) (NM)																															
3 Aerial MEDEVAC (4) (CA)																															
4 Aviation support (13) (CA)																															
5 Aviation support (13) (CA)																															
6																															
August																															
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
1 Aviation support (152) (CA)																															
2 Aerial MEDEVAC (4) (CA) (cont.)																															
3 Aerial MEDEVAC (4) (CA) (cont.)																															
4 Aviation support (7) (CA)																															
5 Aviation support (10) (OK) (cont.)																															
6 Aviation support (14) (CA) (cont.)																															
7																															
September																															
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
1 Aviation support (4) (CA)																															
2																															
3																															
4																															
5																															
6																															
7 Communication support (2) (TX) (cont.)																															

APPENDIX F

LETTER OF REQUEST TO JOINT TASK FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

8 February 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: LTC Howard, J-5 Plans, JTF-6

SUBJECT: Request for Information

1. The purpose of this letter is to request information from your organization for use in writing my master's thesis. I am a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and am working toward a Master of Military Art and Science Degree. The topic of my thesis is "Analysis of a Committed Joint Task Force Designed to Conduct Counterdrug Operations to Interdict the Flow of Illegal Drugs Along the Southwest Border."
2. My primary research question is: What could be a force structure of a Joint Task Force that would be comprised of active duty forces that would be committed to actively conduct counterdrug operations injunction with law enforcement agencies to interdict the flow of illicit drugs along the Southwest border? I am concentrating on the design of a Joint Task Force which would be subordinate to the existing JTF-6.
3. I would very much appreciate information on completed support requests. From LTC Matthews briefing slide there have been 2,584 completed support requests. I do not know if you can provide all the data that I would like on all the completed support requests. For my research, the more the better. However, whatever you can provide will be helpful. As a minimum I would like FY 95 data. Data from previous years will reinforce my conclusions. For each completed support request I would like the following information about the request and the unit who supported the request: category of support, mission(abbreviated), service, component (active, reserve, national guard), unit, higher headquarters(HQs), higher's HQs, and home station. As an example of what I would like I have used three completed support requests that were briefed during LTC Matthews' presentation.

Categor y of Support	Mission (Abrev)	Service	Compo- nent	Unit	Higher HQs	Higher' s HQs	Home Station
Engineer	Construc-tion Opns	Army	Active	864 En Bn	555 En Gp	1 Corps	Fort Huachuc a
?	Ground Recon	Marine	?	1st Bn	7th Marines	1st Marine Division	Camp Pendleton
?	Ground Recon	Army	Active	2-502 Avn Bn	2d Armd Division		Fort Hood Texas
?	Ground Recon	Marine	?	Det A 1st Bn	24th Marines	4th Marine Division	New Orleans

The slides that I used to construct this example table were not clear on some of the items of information that I would like to have. Where I wasn't sure I have put question marks (?).

4. I am also interested in developing a clear picture of the threat we are facing along the Southwest border. In relation to that effort, I would appreciate any unclassified information you could provide me in these topic areas:

- a. Descriptions of primary drug trafficking organizations, to include numbers of personnel, organizational structure and leadership.
- b. Methods of operations for these organizations.
- c. Weapons and other equipment used.
- d. Strengths and weaknesses.

5. As I am a student and do not have an office, please send the information to my home address:

MAJ Joseph A. Southcott  
60 3rd Infantry Road  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

My telephone number, should you need it, is 913-651-5616.

6. I very much appreciate your assistance in this research effort and look forward to any information you can send.

JOSEPH A. SOUTHCOTT  
MAJ, In  
U.S. Army

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
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ATTN: J-5 Plans (LTC Gerald G. Howard)  
Fort Bliss, Texas XXXXX
4. Mr. John A. Reichley  
Directorate of Academic Operations  
USACGSC  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
5. LTC Noel B. Bergeron  
Leadership Instruction Department  
USACGSC  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
6. Dr. Arthur T. Frame  
Department of Joint and Combined Operations  
USACGSC  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

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
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